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ON DUOPOLY AND COMPENSATION GAMES IN
THE CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY
Robert J. Rhee
ABSTRACT—Credit rating agencies are important institutions of the global
capital markets. If they had performed properly, the financial crisis of
2008–2009 would not have occurred, and the course of world history
would have been different. There is a near universal consensus that reform
is needed, but none as to the best approach. The problem has not been
solved. This Article offers the simplest fix proposed thus far, and it is
contrarian. This Article accepts the central role of rating agencies in the
regulation of bond investments, the realities of a duopoly, and the issuerpay model of compensation. The status quo is the baseline. While not ideal,
this much-maligned state is still well suited for robust competition leading
to more accurate credit ratings. The role of regulation should be to create
the conditions necessary to induce competition. This Article proposes that a
small, recurring portion of revenue earned by the largest rating agencies
should be ceded to fund a pay-for-performance bonus, and that the agencies
should compete for this bonus on a periodic winner-take-all basis. This
modest, at-the-margin bonding mechanism would significantly affect
incentives and outcomes: conflict of interest and implicit coordination
would be minimized; competition would increase; the quality of ratings
would improve. Furthermore, this funding scheme can promote the
incubation of smaller new competitors through a program of “shadow
competition,” creating a competitive information market on credit ratings.
Since regulation would only be required to assess performance and would
not change the fundamental industrial organization, this proposal has the
advantage of simplicity and feasibility.
AUTHOR—John H. & Mary Lou Dasburg Professor of Law (designate),
University of Florida Levin College of Law; Professor of Law, University
of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Professor, Johns Hopkins
Carey Business School; Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law
Center. This Article was presented at the 2012 conferences of the Law &
Society Association, Midwest Law & Economics Association, and the
Italian Society of Law & Economics, and at the University of Minnesota
Law School. I thank Mark Graber, Michelle Harner, Claire Hill, Donald
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INTRODUCTION
Credit rating agencies are vital to the global economy. They assign
credit ratings to bond issues and issuers, and most public bonds carry a
credit rating, which is a probabilistic assessment of the risk of default.
Credit ratings impact the price at which bonds are issued in their primary
market and traded in secondary markets, and the assessment of risk in the
portfolios of investors. These factors are directly linked to the regulation of
bond investors such as banks, broker–dealers, insurers, and investment
funds.
Although rating agencies are some of the most important institutions
of the global capital markets,1 they have long been criticized for providing
inaccurate credit ratings.2 Some of their failures, like downgrading Enron’s
debt to “junk” status only days before its bankruptcy filing, have been
spectacular.3 These past lapses now seem like peccadillos when compared
1

See generally HERWIG M. LANGOHR & PATRICIA T. LANGOHR, THE RATING AGENCIES AND
THEIR CREDIT RATINGS: WHAT THEY ARE, HOW THEY WORK, AND WHY THEY ARE RELEVANT (2008)
(providing an overview of the business of credit rating).
2
See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999).
3
Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145,
1145 (2003).
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to the catastrophic failure to properly rate structured finance instruments4
during the run-up to the financial crisis of 2008–2009. The narrative is well
known and generally accepted. The systematic overrating of mortgagebacked securities, collateralized debt obligations, and other complex
structured finance debt instruments inflated valuations and investor
demand, reduced the perception of risk, and permitted wholesale
investments in de facto junk bonds by regulated financial institutions that
were required to invest only in “investment grade” securities.5 Like a
pandemic, these overrated and overpriced “toxic” securities infected the
balance sheets of many large financial institutions and triggered a global
economic contagion. The financial crisis almost certainly would not have
occurred had rating agencies performed properly.6 Rating agencies are
important monitors of the global financial industry. The importance of their
vigilance and the policy implications of their failure cannot be overstated.
Reform of the credit rating industry is one of the most important
unresolved agendas of post-financial crisis market regulation. Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the securities industry, and
scholars are actively scrutinizing the problem. With the recent explosion of
commentary and analysis by scholars7 and government agencies8 seeking to
4

The basic attribute of structured finance is the creation of securities through financial engineering,
which is required because the issuer’s financing needs require a “tailor-made product or process.”
FRANK J. FABOZZI, HENRY A. DAVIS & MOORAD CHOUDHRY, INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURED
FINANCE 1 (2006).
5
See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 74–78 (defining “junk” and investment grade bonds).
6
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED
STATES xxv (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (“This crisis could not have
happened without the rating agencies.”); see also Lawrence J. White, The Credit-Rating Agencies and
the Subprime Debacle, 21 CRITICAL REV. 389, 396 (2009) (“It is clear that the credit rating agencies
were at the center of the subprime debacle.”).
7
See, e.g., Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 253 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231, 234 (2011); Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, IV & Chris Sagers, Faith-Based
Financial Regulation: A Primer on Oversight of Credit Rating Organizations, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 557
(2009); Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable
Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2010); Claire A. Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank’s
Rating Agency Reform, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 133 (2011); Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004); Claire A. Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After
Enron?, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 283 (2009); Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job
Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585 (2010); John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating
Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform,
and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109; Yair Listokin & Benjamin
Taibleson, If You Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy Through Incentive
Compensation, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2010); Lois R. Lupica, Credit Rating Agencies, Structured
Securities, and the Way Out of the Abyss, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 639 (2009); Timothy E. Lynch,
Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment,
59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227 (2009); Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 749 (2013); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User
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shape the ultimate reform, the sense of urgency for reform of the credit
rating industry is palpable. Proposals include promoting more competition
among rating agencies, imposing greater civil liability, changing rating
agency compensation structures from issuer-pay to user-pay models, and
substituting credit ratings with market metrics.
Although we do not have a consensus on the fix,9 the problem has
been identified. In the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,10 Congress first acknowledged
the problem of rating agencies as they related to the corporate governance
and accounting failures of the era. In the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Congress again
recognized the problem of rating agencies as they related to the financial
crisis.11 In this eight-year legislative arc, a consensus has formed that the
core problem is the relationship between compensation and incentive. This
is seen in the Dodd–Frank Act, which requires studies of “alternative
means for compensating nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations that would create incentives for accurate credit ratings.”12 In
singling out compensation for study, Congress correctly recognized the link
among compensation, incentive, and quality of credit ratings. It has
Fee Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1011 (2009); Frank Partnoy,
Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger, the Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two
Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431 (2009); Joseph A.
Grundfest & Evgeniya E. Hochenberg, Investor Owned and Controlled Rating Agencies: A Summary
Introduction (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 66, 2009; Stanford Univ. Law
Sch. Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 391, 2009), available at papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1494527.
8
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-240, CREDIT RATING AGENCIES:
ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION MODELS FOR NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING
ORGANIZATIONS (2012) [hereinafter GAO 2012 REPORT]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2011
SUMMARY REPORT OF COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF EACH NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION [hereinafter SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT] (as required by Section
15E(p)(3)(C) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT
ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS (2011) [hereinafter SEC JAN.
2011 REPORT] (as required by Section 6 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-782, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ACTION NEEDED
TO IMPROVE RATING AGENCY REGISTRATION PROGRAM AND PERFORMANCE-RELATED DISCLOSURES
(2010) [hereinafter GAO 2010 REPORT]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND
FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (2003)
[hereinafter SEC REPORT ON ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT AGENCIES] (as required by Section
702(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002).
9
A number of commentators have previously provided thoughtful critiques of these reform
proposals, and their strengths, weaknesses, and feasibility have been well analyzed. See, e.g., Coffee,
supra note 7, at 251–71 (providing an overview of the reform choices); Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra
note 7, at 592–608 (same).
10
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745.
11
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872–90 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.).
12
Id. § 939F(b)(4), 124 Stat. at 1889; see also id. § 939D(a), 124 Stat. at 1888 (requiring GAO to
study “alternative means for compensating . . . to provide more accurate credit ratings”).
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signaled a willingness to reform the compensation scheme for credit rating
agencies and has already given the SEC significant authority to regulate
compensation,13 but thus far there has been no feasible reform proposal.14
This Article responds to Congress’s clarion call to resolve this essential
problem of industrial organization.15 It proposes a simple, contrarian
solution to positively link compensation and incentive.
Unlike all other reform proposals, my proposal accepts the status quo
of the much-maligned industry organization as a baseline reality. This
Article does not argue for fundamental reconfiguration of the industry or
regulation. It leaves intact the role of the major rating agencies in the
regulation of financial institutions and investment portfolios. It assumes the
continued existence of a duopoly and accepts the much-criticized issuerpay model, in which the issuer of the debt security pays for the rating. With
the luxury of starting from scratch, these conditions may not be the ideal
model,16 but the world is imperfect and wishful thinking is not a policy
proposal. In proposing concrete reforms, the pragmatist should
acknowledge the realities of a preexisting multi-billion dollar credit rating
industry and a $150 trillion credit market17 that depends heavily on credit
ratings. From a regulatory-feasibility perspective, the simplest path forward
requires the least amount of structural change to large, complex institutions
and capital markets; and perhaps this counterintuitively leads to the most
effective reform.
The basic problem is this: industry concentration coupled with the
issuer-pay model reduces the incentive to compete and perform. Since
incentive is the condition necessary to induce competition, the problem can
be fixed by implementing a structured compensation scheme overlaid onto
the issuer-pay model. The simplest solution is to establish a mandatory
pay-for-performance compensation scheme in which a fixed percentage of
accrued revenue is ceded to fund a performance bonus. At periodic
intervals, the regulator should award the bonus to the best performing
rating agency for the period on a winner-take-all basis. Proper incentive is
achieved through mandatory participation in a compensation competition.
This idea requires minimal regulatory intrusion into the industry. The
13

See id. § 939F(d), 124 Stat. at 1888.
See infra Part I.D (identifying the problems with the current proposals).
15
See Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 565 (noting that the problem is one of industrial
organization). Industrial organization is the branch of economics dealing with the structure of industries
and the behavior of firms in the market. DONALD RUTHERFORD, ECONOMICS: THE KEY CONCEPTS 114–
15 (2007).
16
See Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 7, at 84 (“The concentrated market
structure in the rating agency industry and the barriers to entry clearly cause some deviations from the
‘ideal’ of a fully competitive market.”).
17
See CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MAPPING GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS 2011, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT], available at http://www.mckinsey.com/
Insights/MGI/Research/Financial_Markets/Mapping_global_capital_markets_2011 (data as of 2010).
14
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proposal benefits from simplicity, administrability, and economic
feasibility. It can fundamentally reform the industry with minimal
disruption, even though the rating agencies themselves may not like it.
Part I explains the problem in the industrial organization, describes the
regulatory responses, and briefly summarizes prior reform proposals.
Part II sets forth the proposal, including issues related to implementation.
After establishing the basic scheme, it offers a glimpse of the next step in
the evolution of a more robust market for credit ratings, which is the
creation of a competitive information market for credit ratings through a
program of “shadow competition” among a broader cohort of rating
agencies. Part III discusses the obstacles to implementing the proposal. It
argues that the potential problem of collusion and the difficulty of
formulating a standard for assessment are not insurmountable impediments.
Instead, the politics of Wall Street regulation constitute the most
formidable challenge to implementation.18

18

The scope of my analysis is limited to advancing the conceptual framework of the regulation and
demonstrating its feasibility. This Article does not provide a detailed constitutional analysis of the
proposal, but I note a few factors that may be relevant in such an analysis. Credit rating agency reform
obviously involves the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce as it did in enacting the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010. The proposal here can be
couched as a condition of receiving a regulatory license from the SEC. It could be structured as a fee,
refundable upon demonstration of performance. It could be structured as a tax with a back-end
monetary incentive. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–601 (2012)
(holding that the individual mandate to purchase health insurance of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 171–74 (1992) (holding that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act’s monetary and
access incentive provisions, including the awarding of collected surcharges, were valid). While the
proposal may have in mind the three specific firms that currently dominate the credit rating market, it
could be couched in neutral language with regulation addressing only the largest firms: for example,
firms having market share in credit ratings of 10% or more. This would capture only the duopoly of
Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) and Standard & Poor’s rating service (S&P), plus Fitch Ratings
(Fitch), since the other SEC-designated nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs)
collectively have about 3% of the market share. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F.
Supp. 2d 987, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting “Discount Superstore”
with specific characteristics did not violate equal protection or dormant commerce principles); Retail
Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 501 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that a state statute
requiring employers of specified criteria that spend less than 8% of total wages on health insurance to
pay the difference to the state did not violate equal protection). Any legislative or regulatory proposal
may invoke the Commerce Clause, taxing power, due process, equal protection, and neutrality
principles, as the enactment of meaningful regulation such as the Dodd–Frank Act or the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act would. This Article is limited to setting forth the compensation scheme to optimize
performance from an economic and game theory perspective.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF PRIOR PROPOSALS

A. The Bond Market and the Credit Rating Industry
Long-term debt and equity fund the long-term capital needs of
corporations.19 In 2010 the global bond market had outstanding bonds of
$108 trillion, as compared to the equity market of $54 trillion.20 This ratio
of debt to equity is not surprising. Academic theories in corporate finance
support the view that debt, when properly used, can be value enhancing.21
There is a “pecking order” in external financing, and firms prefer to issue
the least risky securities first, which is debt.22 The credit market is
enormously important to the global capital markets and the smooth
functioning of a market economy.
Publicly traded bonds are rated.23 A credit rating is necessary because
many financial institutions, the primary investors of bonds, are limited in
the amount of risk they can assume in their portfolios. A credit rating is an
opinion provided by a rating agency for a fee24 on the credit risk or
creditworthiness of the bond issue, which reflects the probability of default
of that bond.25 It places the issue or issuer on an ordinal scale of credit
ratings. Among the major rating agencies, their alphanumeric rating scales
are very similar. The major taxonomical division in ratings is between
“investment grade” and “speculative grade,”26 and within each are finer
divisions of ratings.27 Importantly, a credit rating is not an opinion on the

19

See ROBERT J. RHEE, ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF BUSINESS FOR LAWYERS 231–32 (2012).
MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 17, at 2. These figures do not include nonsecuritized bank loans,
which add another $49 trillion in outstanding debt. Id.
21
See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 418–33 (10th ed. 2011); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976);
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A
Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963).
22
BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 462.
23
LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 23; Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 7,
at 46–48.
24
The typical fee for a corporate bond issue is in the range of 4–5 basis points. LANGOHR &
LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 413. Because structured finance instruments are more complex, the fees are
generally higher. Id.; SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 22. One basis point is 1/100th of a
percent, and thus 100 basis points equals 1%. The finer division represented by basis points is necessary
in some areas of finance, particularly bonds.
25
See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 24 (providing definitions from the three leading
rating agencies). “The term ‘credit rating’ means an assessment of the creditworthiness of an obligor as
an entity or with respect to specific securities or money market instruments.” Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006 § 3(a)(60), Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1328.
26
Bonds in this latter category are called “junk” or “high-yield” bonds.
27
For investment grade, S&P and Fitch provide these ordinal ratings: AAA, AA+, AA, AA–, A+,
A, A–, BBB+, BBB, BBB–. Moody’s rates the same categories with slightly different nomenclature:
Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3. Ratings continue with speculative-grade ratings of
20
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value of the bond.28 Like the value of stocks, the value of bonds may
depend on a number of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. A credit rating
obviously affects value: higher rated bonds should be priced higher and
offer lower yields, and vice versa. But the value of a bond also incorporates
other market factors such as the prevailing interest rate environment,
macroeconomic factors, and transitory financial market movements, all of
which may move bond prices and yields as well as yield spreads among
classes of bonds. However, value and creditworthiness are distinct. A credit
rating is an opinion only on the probability of default, the essence of
creditworthiness.29
While rating agencies provide opinions in private transactions, they de
facto regulate investments and serve a public gatekeeping function.30 The
use of credit ratings has been pervasive in regulation of investments.31 An
example is the regulation of bank capital, which among other things
employs credit ratings.32 Another example is Rule 2a-7 of the Investment
Company Act, which provides that a money market fund shall “present
minimal credit risks” as may be determined by credit rating.33 Still another
example is the use of ratings to regulate the investment portfolios of
insurance companies.34 The financial crisis has proved that the network of
information intermediation among issuers, investment bankers, rating
agencies, and investors imparts externalities on the broader society. Thus,
credit ratings are a public good.35
The credit rating industry is highly concentrated.36 The three largest
rating agencies are Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), Standard &
BB+ and Ba1, going down to C and D levels. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 47, 74–78
(describing ordinal rankings). Bonds rated below BBB– and Baa3 are junk bonds. Id. at 44–45.
28
Id. at 64–72.
29
Id. at 24.
30
Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 934 (1998); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 301, 302 (2004).
31
See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 430–39. As of March 5, 2013, a Westlaw search of
the term “investment grade” produced 524 hits in state statutes and administrative regulations
databases, and 115 hits in C.F.R. and U.S.C. databases. The term “Moody’s or Standard /2 Poor!”
produced 879 hits in state statutes and administrative regulations databases, and 90 hits in C.F.R. and
U.S.C. databases.
32
12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A (2013); id. pt. 225, app. G; id. pt. 1750, subpt. B, app. A; see also SEC
JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 11–12 (noting the incorporation of the concept of “investment
grade” in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as well as other federal statutes and regulations).
33
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2012).
34
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-544 (2002) (providing that an insurer may invest in bonds
“which have received an investment grade rating”).
35
See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 429 (“It is clear that today’s CRA industry presents
plenty of public interest externalities.”).
36
See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 6–7. Economists measure market concentration
using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, “calculated by squaring the market share of each firm
competing in the market and then summing the resulting number.” Id. Based on this calculation, the
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Poor’s Rating Service (S&P), and Fitch Ratings (Fitch). As of 2010, the
market shares based on the number of ratings provided are: S&P 42%,
Moody’s 37%, Fitch 18%, and the other seven SEC-designated nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) add up to about 3%.37
Together, Moody’s and S&P are typically seen as a duopoly or partnermonopoly,38 but this status is not quite correct because Fitch is a smaller
but significant third competitor. The industry is somewhere between a
duopoly and an oligopoly. In this paper, I call this arrangement a “duopoly
plus” to reflect that Moody’s and S&P have dominant market shares but
Fitch cannot be ignored.
B. Poor Performance and Its Causes
Systemic poor performance of rating agencies poses deep problems of
public policy and economics. Most recently, rating agencies systematically
overrated highly speculative structured finance securities backed by
mortgages underwritten during the housing bubble.39 The results were
catastrophic. By 2010, over 90% of the subprime mortgage-backed
securities issued between 2006 and 2007 with triple-A ratings had been
downgraded to junk bonds by Moody’s and S&P.40 This 90% error rate is
breathtaking for an industry that rates bonds on very fine ordinal grades.
During this period, rating agencies engaged in egregiously lax and
irresponsible business practices, and there was a systematic failure of due
diligence by the entire industry.41 If rating agencies had rated these
securities as junk bonds, the financial crisis would not have occurred

HHI for the credit rating industry is 3495, implying that there are approximately 2.86 equally sized
firms, which approximates the actual duopoly plus state of the industry. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.3, at 19 (2010) (indicating
that a score of 3495 is a highly concentrated market).
37
SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. This high level of concentration has been a
historical fact of the credit rating industry. SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 11.
38
SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 10–11; JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 284 (2006); Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 569–
70.
39
Coffee, supra note 7, at 236–41; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 581 & n.89.
40
Eric S. Pendergraft, Section 933(b): Nimble Private Regulation of the Capital Market
Gatekeepers, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 515 (2012). In 2006, Moody’s assigned triple-A ratings on
thirty mortgage-related securities per day, and 83% of these securities were ultimately downgraded.
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 6, at xxv. For a definition of junk bonds, see supra
notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
41
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 242–46 (providing account and analysis). Recently, the U.S.
Department of Justice sued Standard & Poor’s for fraud related to the latter’s ratings of mortgagerelated bonds during the financial crisis. Complaint for Civil Money Penalties and Demand for Jury
Trial, United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. CV13-00779 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013); see also Mary
Williams Walsh & Andrew Ross Sorkin, U.S. Accuses S.&P. of Fraud in Suit on Loan Bundles, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A1. In this complaint, the United States avers that S&P engaged in a scheme to
defraud investors. Complaint, supra, § VI, at 28–115.
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because investor demand would have collapsed due to regulatory
restrictions on investments, thus breaking the securitization pipeline that
fueled the housing bubble.
The problems of the credit rating industry have many causes.
Commentators have well documented the major factors, which have been
generally accepted as the cause of the problem. The following is a
summary of their findings and analyses.
1. Conflict of Interest.—Rating agencies are said to have an inherent
conflict of interest arising from the issuer-pay fee structure,42 which is the
predominant form of compensation in the credit rating industry.43 The
issuer pays the fee for the credit rating service, rather than the bond
investor or a subscriber to rating information. Since a high rating reduces
the issuer’s cost of debt, the potential for a conflict of interest is obvious.
Issuers and investment bankers, the argument goes, can “shop” for ratings,
and this competition for business can compromise the objectivity of rating
agencies.44 With that said, the conflict of interest argument is more nuanced
as there is a counterargument. The issuer-pay model is not unique to rating
agencies, as accountants, lawyers, investment bankers, and consultants are
also paid by issuers.45 And, since obtaining multiple ratings per issue is the
standard market practice, issuers may not really have leverage,46 or the
leverage may be weak at best. Empirical evidence indirectly supports this
point as fees for credit ratings have significantly increased from 2001 to
2007, suggesting that, at least with respect to pricing, issuers did not have
the “shop elsewhere” leverage against rating agencies.47
2. Lack of Competition.—Rating agencies do not compete so much
as they coexist in a profitable market.48 There are three reasons that
competition is lacking. First, the market is heavily concentrated, thus
reducing competiveness. Market concentration “permits these nominal
42

See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 16–17, 19; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at
582; Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 99; Lupica, supra note 7, at 662. Some commentators have
also suggested that individual credit analysts have conflicts of interest arising from employment
opportunities with issuers or investment banks. See Jess Cornaggia et al., Revolving Doors on Wall
Street (Mar. 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2150998.
43
As of 2011, seven of the ten NRSROs operated under the issuer-pay model, and the issuer-pay
model constituted approximately 99% of the total outstanding credit ratings issued by NRSROs. SEC
JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. The NRSROs appear to be trending even more toward the issuerpay compensation model. SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
44
Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 586; Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 99.
45
Coffee, supra note 7, at 255.
46
COFFEE, supra note 38, at 286.
47
LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 414; see also infra note 192 (noting that Warren Buffett
invested in Moody’s because of its pricing power).
48
Coffee, supra note 7, at 231; see also Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, supra note 7, at 146 (“What is
needed in the moderate term is vigorous competition.”).
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competitors to shirk, engaging in less effort and research than if there were
true active competition.”49 Second, competition is further muted by the
industry custom of obtaining multiple ratings from different rating
agencies.50 The vast majority of new bond issues carry multiple ratings.51
Quite literally, then, the competition among firms can be characterized as
typically “win–win.” Third, there are no really good substitutes for a credit
rating. Although bond investors frequently conduct analysis of bonds
independent of credit ratings, the regulatory facet of a credit rating is
difficult to substitute. These aspects of rating agencies ensure a level of
sustained business irrespective of quality.
3. Ineffectiveness of Reputation Capital.—Reputation capital does
not sufficiently incentivize performance. In a competitive market,
reputation capital may ensure a certain level of quality and incentive, but it
does not incentivize performance well when two firms have cornered the
market for a necessary service.52 One would think that after the failures
related to the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the reputations of rating
agencies would have been damaged, but the businesses of Moody’s and
S&P have not been hurt by reputational concerns in the wake of the
financial crisis. They are enjoying healthy profits. For example, after the
financial crisis, Moody’s net income has continued to grow significantly:
$402 million (2009), $507 million (2010), $571 million (2011), and $690
million (2012).53 The 2012 earnings are almost at the same level Moody’s
achieved in 2007 ($701 million), at the apex of the credit bubble and rating
agency revenues.54 At least for the moment, the profitability of the major
rating agencies is primarily a function of market environment and
investors’ appetite for fixed income securities, which dictate the demand
for rating services.55 Only Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch are large enough to
49

COFFEE, supra note 38, at 285.
See id. at 286 (noting the “well-established norm that two ratings are necessary”).
51
See COFFEE, supra note 38, at 286; LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 54; Fitzpatrick &
Sagers, supra note 7, at 569 & n.38. In a 1999 survey of issuers, 97.4% bought credit ratings from
multiple rating agencies: “[a]bout three-quarters hire[d] two rating agencies and one-fifth hired three or
more” rating agencies. LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 54–55.
52
See Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 582 (“While it is commonly argued that they will
thereby be penalized when the poor quality of their information is disclosed, that argument presumes
competitive markets.”).
53
Moody’s Corp., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No.
001-14037, at 65 [hereinafter 2012 Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K]; Moody’s Corp., Annual Report
for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2011 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-14037, at 64 [hereinafter 2011
Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K].
54
Moody’s Corp., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2007 (Form 10-K), File No.
001-14037, at 46.
55
See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that the market share of rating agencies
in structured finance has not declined despite the systemic failure of the leading rating agencies in this
sector, but that the overall market demand for asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities has
declined due to the lack of investor confidence in the integrity of these securities).
50
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meet the aggregate demand of the bond market. Most scholars have been
skeptical that reputation alone optimally incentivizes quality performance.56
4. Larger Perspective on Reputation Capital.—Reputation capital
does not depend on only historical instances of large, egregious errors. It is
based on a collection of factors. It incorporates a rating agency’s past
record of good performance, adequacy of resources to provide ratings
across an enormous bond market, and longevity and history of the firm.
“Economies of scale and sunk costs may be economic factors which may
favor the larger, more established rating agencies.”57 Commentators have
suggested that there are important first-mover advantages58 and reputational
“stickiness”59 that have enduring competitive benefits. These factors are
highly relevant to reputation, though critics of rating agencies sometimes
fail to credit them. Even if the three rating agencies performed poorly, their
overall reputations may still be better than those of their competitors in the
eyes of issuers.
5. Regulatory Barriers.—Regulatory barriers also protect rating
agencies from competitors. Financial regulators require institutional
investors and broker–dealers to obtain credit ratings for debt securities in
their investment portfolios for the purpose of prudential-based regulation of
investment activities and risk bearing.60 However, fearing fly-by-night
rating agencies, the SEC has parsimoniously granted the NRSRO status.61
This regulatory philosophy effectively froze out new rating agencies from
the market for credit ratings.62 These regulatory barriers have protected the
duopoly plus structure, stifled competition among rating agencies, and
diminished the importance of reputation capital. Nominally, these
regulatory barriers have been somewhat lowered due to the liberalization of
56

See Bai, supra note 7, at 270; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 589–90; Hunt, supra note 7,
at 155–81; Manns, Rating Risk, supra note 7, at 1048–50. But see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (“Rating
agencies are already motivated to provide accurate and efficient ratings because their profitability is
directly tied to reputation.”).
57
SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
58
See COFFEE, supra note 38, at 284 (“Logic suggests that there should be a significant barrier,
because reputational capital cannot be acquired overnight.”); Coffee, supra note 7, at 248 (“Overall, this
pattern suggests that there are important ‘first mover’ advantages because reputational capital is hard to
acquire and goes to the first firms in the field. If licensing power alone could explain the dominance of
the Big Three, then the newer members of the SEC’s NRSRO club should be sharing in a collective
oligopoly.”).
59
See Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job, supra note 7, at 604 (“Thus, it would
seem that even if no rating agency had a regulatory license, stickiness might keep investors with the
major agencies even regardless of disastrous performance.”).
60
Coffee, supra note 7, at 246–47.
61
Id. at 247; White, supra note 6, at 391–92. Section 4 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006 required rating agencies that desired the NRSRO status to be registered with the SEC.
62
White, supra note 6, at 392.
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the NRSRO license procurement process.63 There are now eleven
NRSROs.64 However, the major NRSROs continue to receive regulatory
rent.65
6. Natural Barriers.—Aside from regulatory barriers, newer and
smaller rating agencies confront natural barriers to market entry. Large
rating agencies provide broad coverage of the bulk of the global capital
market, which includes an enormous credit market (over $150 trillion),66
and systematize credit information through a similar, if not uniform, set of
credit ratings. This information platform is important to investors and
regulators. There is a positive network effect to size and scale—i.e., one
cannot discount the benefit of having the broad spectrum of bonds and
issuers in the very large credit market be rated under presumably a
common methodology of firms that can handle such a large task. Newer
and smaller rating agencies are disadvantaged because they lack this broad
capability. Because they are smaller and have less financial resources, they
also cannot compete as well for professional talent. And, if they do
compete with the larger rating agencies, the latter could simply buy out the
competition to maintain the current state of industry concentration, unless
the M&A market is proscribed by law.67 Forces stronger than the SEC’s
ability to grant more NRSRO licenses are at work in perpetuating an
uncompetitive industry.68

63

See infra Part I.C.
They are HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V., Egan-Jones Rating Company, Realpoint LLC,
LACE Financial Corp., A.M. Best Company, Inc., DBRS Ltd., Fitch, Inc., Japan Credit Rating Agency,
Ltd., Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Rating and Investment Information, Inc., and Standard & Poor’s
Ratings Services. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”), U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm (last visited Nov.
21, 2013). The SEC’s website has the commission orders granting each rating agency its NRSRO
status. Id.
65
See RUTHERFORD, supra note 15, at 181 (defining “economic rent” as “a return aris[ing] from
the factor of production being in short supply”).
66
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
67
That Moody’s and S&P would defend their competitive position is certain. Indeed, Moody’s has
explicitly stated its strategy: “Moody’s will make investments to defend and enhance its core businesses
in an attempt to position the Company to fully capture market opportunities resulting from global debt
capital market expansion and increased business investment spending.” 2012 Moody’s Corporation
Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 12. It is easy to see how Moody’s and S&P could acquire competitive
threats as a part of corporate strategy.
68
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 248 (“This continuity suggests that the Big Three’s dominance
cannot be adequately explained by the regulatory powers the SEC allocated to them under its NRSRO
system, as their market power both preexisted and survived the period in which they alone had licensing
power.”); Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 570 (“But it seems likely that even if NRSRO rules
were to be repealed, entry now would be severely impeded by the need to establish reputation as a
seasoned CRO.”).
64
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7. Complexity of Modern Finance.—The complexity of modern
financial markets has increased significantly.69 For much of their history,
rating agencies analyzed plain vanilla corporate bonds of issuers whose
capital structure was composed of debt and equity.70 While the technical
aspects of credit analysis can certainly be quite complicated and large
errors occur (e.g., the case of Enron), much of this analysis can be done
through fundamental analysis of financial statements.71 In the past several
decades, credit analysis has become more difficult as financial markets and
securities instruments have become more complex. Structured finance
securities such as mortgaged-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations are much more complicated in structure and valuation than
simply the straight debt obligation of a company with an ordinary balance
sheet, a history of financial performance, and projections of future
performance.72 Complexity is the handmaiden of uncertainty. With greater
complexity, the task of the rating agencies has become more difficult.73
8. Implicit Collusion with Investors.—Lastly, a “dirty secret,”74 or
what John Coffee has dubbed a “sinister danger,”75 is that investors also
implicitly wanted overrated securities during the credit rating bubble. Many
financial institutions are regulated as to the types of investments they can
make and have capital requirements for particular portfolios of
investments.76 Inflated credit ratings permitted regulated investors and
69

See Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the Business Education
of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 363 (2009) (“In the past several decades, the financial markets have
seen geometric growth in complexity.”).
70
See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 497 (2005) (tracing the rise of
securitization to the 1970s).
71
For example, simple financial ratios on profitability, liquidity, and solvency can be performed
with information from audited financial statements. See RHEE, supra note 19, at 79–83.
72
SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 10 (noting increased financial complexity as a factor in
the increase in the demand for credit ratings).
73
See id.; Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies, supra note 7, at 284.
74
See Aaron Lucchetti, Kara Scannell & Craig Karmin, SEC Aims to Rein In the Role of Ratings,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 2008, at C1 (“The dirty secret of some bond investors is that they simply bought
securities with the highest yield for a given rating, which is why they snapped up complicated securities
tied to subprime mortgages. Those securities often got high ratings but yielded more than other, more
standard securities with the same rating.”).
75
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 259 (“[T]here is the even more sinister danger that many institutions
(in particular, money market funds) wanted inflated ratings so that they could earn the higher returns
from riskier securities. To hold such higher yielding securities, it was necessary for them to be able to
rely on the stability of the rating and the unlikelihood of a post-issuance rating downgrade.”); see also
Jess Cornaggia & Kimberly J. Cornaggia, Does the Bond Market Want Informative Credit Ratings?
(Feb. 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://business.nd.edu/uploadedFiles/Academic_
Centers/Study_of_Financial_Regulation/pdf_and_documents/Does_the_Bond_Market_Want_Informati
ve_Credit_Ratings.pdf (arguing that rating agencies were slow to downgrade ratings to serve
institutional desires to hold risky securities).
76
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
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portfolios to invest in risky securities that were expected to produce greater
yields.77 In this sense, incorrectly rated securities were real options78 to
evade the letter and spirit of the prudential regulation, and like all options
they benefitted the holder to the extent the investor was not naïve. Thus,
inflated ratings permit greater discretion in investment activities to pursue
profitable yields.
*

*

*

This litany of causal factors shows that the industrial organization of
the credit rating industry is uniquely problematic. Rating agencies are not
optimally organized to provide the highest quality credit ratings, and the
problem has been difficult to solve. A major problem has been the
inadequate link between compensation and proper incentive. The public
policy implications are several. Since competition is not vigorous, there is
less incentive to improve and innovate even as financial instruments and
capital markets have become more complex, requiring ever more diligent
and competent rating services. When the industry exists as a duopoly plus
in which the regulatory and competitive barriers to market entry are high,
and when the need for credit ratings is substantial, the effectiveness of a
reputation market as a bond on performance is questionable at best. The
lack of robust competition and proper bonding of performance will
continue to undermine the quality of credit ratings even as they continue to
play an important role in an increasingly complex capital market.
C. Regulatory Responses
In both the United States and Europe, rating agencies were not directly
regulated until 2006.79 Instead, rating agencies were indirectly regulated by
the SEC and regulators of financial institutions through the regulation of
investments and capital structure.80 Although the NRSRO designation was
important, the SEC never officially defined the status or the procedure to
obtain it and was parsimonious in granting the designation.81 Since the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which required the SEC to conduct a study of the

77

See Coffee, supra note 7, at 234 (“But in choosing between these options, a dirty little secret
about credit ratings must be recognized; investors have biases of their own, and many want inflated and
stable credit ratings that allow them to hold risky securities.”).
78
A real option is an option that is embedded in a particular situation or choice and that can be
analyzed and valued from the perspective of option-pricing theory. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra
note 21, at 253–55.
79
Coffee, supra note 7, at 246.
80
Id. at 246–47.
81
Id.
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rating agencies but did not otherwise regulate them,82 Congress has enacted
two statutes that substantially regulate rating agencies.
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 created a regulatory
framework for the provision of NRSRO status.83 The statute granted the
SEC rulemaking powers with respect to the regulation of conflict of
interest, disclosure, performance monitoring, and annual reporting
requirements.84 However, it denied the SEC the power to “regulate the
substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which
any nationally recognized statistical rating organization determines credit
ratings.”85 In Congress’s view, the SEC lacked the required expertise to
regulate credit rating and financial models.86 Pursuant to the statute’s grant
of power, the SEC promulgated a number of rules governing the NRSRO
application procedure,87 recordkeeping, disclosure, reporting of information
and experience data,88 regulation of abusive practices and conflicts of
interest,89 and competition among NRSROs.90
The Dodd–Frank Act is the other major legislation.91 The statute
enhanced the potential liability of rating agencies. Section 939G of the
statute enhances accountability by exposing rating agencies to greater
liability. It exposes rating agencies to potential liability under Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933.92 Section 933 provides that the enforcement and
penalty provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 shall apply to statements
made by a rating agency to the same extent as registered public accounting

82

Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 797 (Section 702 requires the
SEC to “conduct a study of the role and function of credit rating agencies in the operation of the
securities market”); see SEC REPORT ON ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT AGENCIES, supra note 8.
83
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327.
84
Id. § 4, 120 Stat. at 1329–38 (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by inserting § 15E).
85
Id. 120 Stat. at 1332 (inserting § 15E(c)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
86
Coffee, supra note 7, at 247.
87
17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1 (2012).
88
Id. §§ 240.17g-2, 240.17g-3, 240.17g-7.
89
Id. §§ 240.17g-4, 240.17g-5, 240.17g-6.
90
Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3). Rule 17g-5(a)(3) provides equal access to information and data disclosed
to the rating agency by the issuer in a structured finance transaction to other NRSROs.
91
See generally Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies Under the Dodd–Frank
Act, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (2011) (providing overview of Dodd–Frank’s
provisions on credit rating agencies).
92
15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(a) (West 2009). Section 11 permits civil liability for false statements and
omissions in a registration statement, subject to certain due diligence defenses of persons subject to
liability. Id. § 77k(a)–(b). Previously, SEC Rule 436(g) provided that credit ratings were not considered
a part of the registration statement “prepared or certified by a person within the meaning of sections 7
and 11 of the [1933] Act.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1). The purpose of Rule 436(g) was to exclude rating
agencies from civil liability under Section 11. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration
Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024, 42,024 (Aug. 18, 1981). However, Section 939G of Dodd–Frank
provides that “Rule 436(g) . . . shall have no force or effect.” Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890 (2010).
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firms and securities analysts.93 It imposes liability on rating agencies that
knowingly or recklessly failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of the
rated security or to obtain reasonable verification of factual elements.94
In addition to enhanced liability, the Dodd–Frank Act provides the
SEC more regulatory powers to enhance the quality of credit ratings. The
statute creates an Office of Credit Rating tasked with supervisory and
monitoring functions.95 The SEC has the power to revoke the NRSRO
status for specific classes of securities.96 Rating agencies are subject to new
regulations on maintenance of data and information on performance and
controls, reporting of results and operations, internal governance, conflict
of interest, and whistle-blowing protections.97 The Dodd–Frank Act also
removes some statutory references to credit ratings98 and requires a study of
the regulatory reliance of credit ratings.99
A legislative arc is apparent in the Sarbanes–Oxley and the Dodd–
Frank acts. Sarbanes–Oxley mandated the SEC to conduct a broad study of
the credit rating industry, including the role of credit rating agencies, the
importance of that role, any impediments to accurate credit ratings, any
barriers to market entry, and any conflicts of interest.100 Dodd–Frank is
more targeted in mandating a study. The statute requires the GAO and the
SEC separately to study how alternative compensation models can increase
the accuracy of credit ratings.101 Congress has now focused on the
relationship between compensation and incentives.
The regulatory reforms of Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank have
improved the credit rating industry. The improvements, however, have
been incremental and have not changed the fundamental dynamics of the
industry.102 The core aspects of the problem remain: a duopoly plus, issuer-
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Dodd–Frank Act § 933, 124 Stat. at 1883–84.
Id.
95
Id. § 932(a)(8), 124 Stat. at 1877.
96
Id. § 932(a)(3)(I), 124 Stat. at 1874. “The Commission may temporarily suspend or permanently
revoke the registration of a nationally recognized statistical rating organization with respect to a
particular class or subclass of securities, if the Commission finds, on the record after notice and
opportunity for hearing, that the nationally recognized statistical rating organization does not have
adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently produce credit ratings with integrity.” Id.
97
Id. §§ 932, 934, 124 Stat. at 1872–84. The SEC has implemented some of these mandates, as
seen in scattered provisions in Rules 17g-1 through 17g-7, but there are more rules to come.
98
Id. § 939, 124 Stat. at 1885–87.
99
Id. § 939A, 124 Stat. at 1887.
100
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702, 116 Stat. 745, 797.
101
Dodd–Frank Act, §§ 939D, 939F.
102
See Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, supra note 7, at 142 (noting that the 2006 statute “did not
prevent rating agencies from disastrously misrating subprime mortgage securities”); Manns,
Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, supra note 7, at 749 (arguing that legal reforms “have fallen far
short”).
94
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pay model, industry custom of multiple ratings, and high natural barriers to
market entry even as regulatory barriers have been somewhat lowered.103
Although the new regulations have not fundamentally changed the
industry or erected an entirely new regulatory edifice, they should not be
underestimated. As I show infra Part III.B., the new regulations have laid
the groundwork to implement an alternative compensation scheme of the
sort proposed in this Article.104
D. Review of Prior Proposals
Over the years, there have been a number of proposals advanced to fix
the problems of the credit rating industry. These proposals can be
organized into three methodology-based categories of reform: reconfigure
the industry structure that has created a duopoly plus and stifled
competition, create disincentives and enhanced accountability through
increased liability, and create positive incentives through alternative
compensation schemes. A number of commentators have provided
thoughtful critiques of these proposals,105 and this Article does not repeat
that exercise here. For useful background information, I briefly summarize
these proposals and critiques.
1. Proposals to Reconfigure the Industrial Organization.—The
boldest proposal is a nationalization of the credit rating industry or some
substantial functions thereof. It has been proposed that the government can
organically create its own ratings capability, or publicly fund rating
agencies.106 Whichever way a public takeover is executed, the proposal of
the government providing credit ratings is problematic. Nationalization
would result in unprecedented intrusion into the pricing mechanism of the
financial markets by the government,107 and would contradict a century-old
market regulatory policy of abstaining from substantive assessments of

103

“The problem is that there is no ready alternative. Moreover, the market norms of using ratings
from rating agencies—indeed, particular rating agencies—will not disappear even if the statutory and
regulatory references are removed [as mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act].” Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank,
supra note 7, at 144.
104
See infra Part III.C.
105
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 251–71; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 592–608.
106
See GAO 2012 REPORT, supra note 8, at 8–9 (summarizing a proposal for random selection of
rating issuances by a ratings clearinghouse); Milosz Gudzowski, Mortgage Credit Ratings and the
Financial Crisis: The Need for a State-Run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency, 2010 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 245 (proposing a government rating agency); Lupica, supra note 7, at 671 (proposing that
the government oversee the rating process and impose penalties such as loss of NRSRO status and
impose monetary fines for poor performance); Lynch, supra note 7, at 300–01 (proposing that rating
agencies be publicly funded).
107
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 260–61 (noting the dangers of a “public” rating agency and
potential political problems).
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investment opportunities.108 Rating government-issued bonds is a major
part of the rating agencies’ business. As recently as spring 2011, S&P
downgraded the United States from AAA to AA+, the first time that the
creditworthiness of the U.S. government has been called into question.109
What would a public or government rating agency do under these
circumstances? The joint power of the government to regulate securities
and investments, assign ratings, and affect valuations in the market may be
too great of an intrusion into private investment decisions and runs the
substantial risk of injecting political considerations into the workings of the
capital markets.110 The potential for mischief, particularly for government
issuers, government-sponsored entities, or favored industries, would be
significant. The notion of a nationalized credit rating industry or substantial
functions thereof is not a good idea, and it is hard to imagine how such a
reform is politically feasible.
Another suggestion is to promote a free market philosophy of spurring
greater competition by creating more rating agencies in the industry.111 This
idea sounds good in the vacuum of abstraction, but the idea of organically
growing more rating agencies does not work absent the existence of a
specific set of favorable conditions, which is the challenge.
First, although the SEC has liberalized the granting of NRSRO
licenses, the eight smaller rating agencies have a minute portion of the
market share. Natural barriers to entry hinder the organic growth of rating
agencies, and there may be nothing that can be done about this situation in
the short to intermediate term.
Second, a free market solution is a bad idea without concurrent reform
of the issuer-pay compensation model. Without compensation reform,
108

It is axiomatic that the predominant regulatory philosophy in securities regulation is disclosure
of information and not assessment of the investment opportunity. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
230 (1988); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977).
109
See United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered to ‘AA+’ Due to Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 5, 2011, 8:13 PM),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245316529563. Moody’s has also
signaled a potential downgrade. See Announcement: Moody’s Updates on Rating Implications of US
Debt Limit, Long-Term Budget Negotiations, MOODY’S INV. SERV. (June 2, 2011),
http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Updates-on-Rating-Implications-of-US-Debt-Limit-Long?
docid=PR_220066 (“Whether the outlook on the [U.S. government’s credit] rating would be stable or
negative would depend upon whether [there is] meaningful progress toward substantial and credible
long-term deficit reduction.”).
110
Coffee, supra note 7, at 260–61. “[M]ore importantly, serious doubt exists that a ‘public’ rating
agency could give a negative (or ‘junk’) rating to an important or politically-favored local firm.
Consider whether over the last decade a U.S. ‘public’ rating agency would have dared to rate the bonds
of General Motors (G.M.) as ‘junk’ (or non-investment grade).” Id. at 260.
111
See Grundfest & Hochenberg, supra note 7, at 5 (proposing that investors create their own
rating agency that must provide a rating for every issue); Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra
note 7, at 85 (proposing “gradually to increase the number of NRSROs and . . . for new firms to
establish their reputations and perhaps carve out some niches”).
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greater competition runs the real risk of a classic “race to the bottom” as
many rating agencies compete for fees and engagements. This was the
poisonous dynamic we saw in the Enron debacle among professional
advisers and gatekeepers.112 A pure competition for engagements may have
the unintended opposite effect.
Third, a free market solution runs into constraints in the labor market.
Credit analysts and rating agencies are not an infinite resource. Indeed, the
Dodd–Frank Act implicitly recognizes the limited labor market and the
potential that rating agencies may not have appropriately trained
employees.113 Creating and sustaining a successful business enterprise is
very difficult, especially in the Wall Street financial services industry.
High-level financial services work requires significant investments in
human capital and a critical mass of highly skilled financial professionals.
The competitive labor market may not support the organic growth of new
rating agencies of substantial size and scale.114
Fourth, if competition by smaller rating agencies ever increases, a
reasonably foreseeable response by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch would be to
compete vigorously or to acquire the competitors.115 We would not expect
these firms to simply stand by as other competitors eat into their market
share. The M&A market, unless proscribed, will perpetuate market
concentration. Thus, for all of these reasons the idea of a free market of
competition is easier assumed than actualized.116
2. Proposals to Reduce the Reliance on Credit Ratings.—Another
suggestion to reconfigure the industrial organization is to substitute credit
ratings with market metrics such as credit (yield) spreads and credit default
swap (CDS) spreads, thus eliminating the problem by marginalizing the
rating agencies.117 A credit (yield) spread is the difference in yields of
112

See generally COFFEE, supra note 38, at 29 (explaining that Enron’s outside consulting firm
acquiesced to their dubious accounting policies out of a fear that “the deep-pocketed client would shift
its consulting business at the drop of a hat”); MALCOLM S. SALTER, INNOVATION CORRUPTED: THE
ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF ENRON’S COLLAPSE 211 (2008) (quoting one of the first business journalists
to challenge Enron’s strategy and results, who explained that Enron “was one of the highest fee-paying
companies on Wall Street, so everybody wanted their business. And firms were willing to do whatever
it took to get that business. The money came far ahead of the ethics.”).
113
Section 936 provides that the SEC shall issue rules designed to ensure that credit analysts meet
“standards of training, experience, and competence necessary to produce accurate ratings.” Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 936, 124 Stat. 1376, 1885
(2010).
114
See supra note 57.
115
See supra note 67.
116
See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (“[B]ecause of the importance of reputation, the
difficulty in establishing a reputation quickly, and other economic factors, it may take some time before
the impact of increased competition can be observed.”).
117
Flannery, Houston & Partnoy, supra note 7; Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 7,
at 85–86; Partnoy, supra note 2, at 624.
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bonds from specific risk-free benchmarks such as treasury instruments of
the same duration.118 A CDS is essentially bond insurance in which the
protection buyer will pay a premium (or spread) to an insurer to protect
against default, and if a default occurs the insurer pays the difference
between the face value of the debt and its market value.119 Credit and CDS
spreads are measures of value and price. The basic argument is that credit
(yield) spreads and CDS spreads incorporate into the price of bonds and
bond insurance the likelihood of default, and that the market is better at
quickly incorporating new information than rating agencies. The proposal
to use market metrics as a substitute for credit ratings is not without
criticism.120
The argument to marginalize the use of credit ratings through a
substitute ultimately depends on whether credit ratings provide some
regulatory or informational utility. Some have argued that credit ratings are
not useful.121 Some have questioned whether reliance on rating agencies can
be justified by empirical data or theory.122 However, others have suggested
that rating agencies are useful on two grounds. First, they correct a problem
of asymmetric information in the credit market by acting as an independent
information intermediary, thus correcting the “lemon” problem.123 Second,
rating agencies reduce the net costs of regulation by relieving investors and
regulators from the burdens of erecting a complex infrastructure to analyze
bond investments.124

118

BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 579.
Id. at 580.
120
See, e.g., LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 440 (concluding that this idea is “illconceived” and “unsubstantiated”).
121
See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 10, 21–24 (2006) (arguing that rating agencies provide no useful informational value to the
capital markets); Partnoy, supra note 2, at 624.
122
See Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 581–85 (arguing that there is little theoretical or
empirical support for the existence of rating agencies).
123
See COFFEE, supra note 38, at 287–88; Arnoud W.A. Boot, Todd T. Milbourn & Anjolein
Schmeits, Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 81 (2006); Listokin &
Taibleson, supra note 7, at 95–97; see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Michael Rothschild & Joseph
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976). The “lemon” problem occurs when there is information
asymmetry on the quality of a good sold on the market between buyers and sellers, and a resulting
mismatch on pricing of the item for sale. The basic thesis is that buyers, not knowing whether the good
is a quality item or a “lemon,” will price the good offered for sale at a lower price than the seller of a
quality item would sell, thus resulting in a market in which “lemons” are sold and quality items are
withdrawn. Some commentators have argued that there is a potential “lemon” problem in the bond
market because issuers and investors stand in a position of information asymmetry concerning credit
quality. Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 95–97. Rating agencies are said to correct this problem
because they act as a neutral third-party information intermediary. Id.
124
COFFEE, supra note 38, at 288.
119
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In addition to these two justifications, I also suggest that rating
agencies serve a useful information-sorting function. Start with the
proposition that the credit market is much larger than the equity market,125
and that investors must analyze this enormous market. Rating agencies
organize information on issues and issuers with a broad taxonomical brush,
which is their rating system. Like any form of organization, this systematic
categorization is useful, though it may be rough or imperfect. Each investor
can then apply its limited resources to make finer investment analyses. By
maintaining an organization of the credit universe, rating agencies create a
common information platform resulting in greater efficiency in the analysis
of creditworthiness. In more concrete terms, the three major rating agencies
deploy almost four thousand bond analysts,126 and the entire credit market
is sorted under a common organization. Despite the current problems of the
credit rating industry, the system of credit ratings has a market rationale.
Clearly, if rating agencies provide useful service as a matter of empirical
fact or theory, then, flaws notwithstanding, the argument to substitute away
(eliminate) credit ratings would be diminished considerably in light of the
fact that the substitute would represent a new, untested regulatory scheme
as an alternative to an existing useful scheme.
The theoretical case that rating agencies are useless is far from clear.
The argument is belied by the empirical facts that rating agencies do exist,
have shareholders who invest in them to the tune of tens of billions of
dollars, and are relied upon by investors in the market. The critics have not
explained why the market or the government continues to massively
misallocate resources if indeed the business of credit ratings is a useless
enterprise. One would think that the collective delusion on the usefulness
of credit rating would have been finally shattered by the experience in the
financial crisis, and yet it is far from clear that all constituents have come to
this conclusion.
Another basic problem is that while the creditworthiness of a bond is
highly relevant to the value of bonds and bond insurance, market valuations
and creditworthiness are different concepts and cannot be conflated as
one.127 The market value of a bond depends on both exogenous and
endogenous factors.128 Default risk is clearly an important factor in value.
However, valuations are subject to market-influenced factors such as the

125

See infra Part I.A (showing the size of the bond market); infra note 208 and accompanying text
(showing the number of outstanding issues covered by rating agencies).
126
See SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (showing that ten NRSROs employed 3990
credit analysts, and that the three largest rating agencies employed 3598 credit analysts).
127
“Credit ratings grade credit risk. . . . [R]atings don’t value the instrument. They couldn’t,
because default risk is only one factor of security risk. The other factor that drives the market value of
the obligation is market risk . . . .” LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 82–83.
128
Id. at 67.
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prevailing interest rate environment and transitory market conditions.129
Historically, yield spreads have narrowed and contracted, in the same way
that stock markets have meandered in a random walk through peaks,
valleys, and plateaus of the financial markets,130 whereas the “intended
cycle-neutrality of ratings is one of the contributors to the stability of
ratings.”131 These are some of the complications that need to be sorted
through when we envision a scheme in which a yield spread in the range of
x% to y% is said to be correlated to a specific ordinal grade of
creditworthiness, particularly when these yield spreads will change in
absolute values and in relative terms. We do not know in what way CDS
spreads or yield spreads, which are continuously subject to market
dynamics, should translate into the equivalent of credit ratings for the
purpose of regulating investment portfolios and financial institutions. These
same concerns also apply to the substitution of CDS spreads for credit
ratings since CDS spreads are also a measure of price and value.132
Market volatility and unpredictability, which affect credit spreads,
may produce regulatory uncertainty and instability to the extent credit
ratings affect the regulation of investments across a wide sector of investors
and financial institutions. Because markets are never static, there would be
a continuous need to monitor markets and assignments of credit ratings;
this means that there must be a large, analytic infrastructure in place,
funded by someone, to do these things. If rating agencies are displaced,
there must be some governmental body or private vendor that continuously
monitors financial data for hundreds of thousands of bond issues
outstanding and applies a set of uniform standards in matching CDS
spreads or yield spreads at any given moment to analyze the investment
portfolios of regulated investors. Even if credit ratings are replaced with
market metrics, someone must monitor the portfolios of regulated investors
based on market metrics, and this must be done continuously since markets
129

Id. at 71. “Hence, ratings and spreads suitably adjust in a reasonably consistent way after some
time, yet significant variability in the relationship remains.” Id. at 72.
130
BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 579 fig. 23.2 (showing historical data for yield
spreads of Aaa, Baa, and high-yield bonds as compared to 10-year Treasuries); see LANGOHR &
LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 65 (showing data on fluctuating credit spreads over time and commenting
that “[t]hese spreads are neither constant over time nor identical for all bonds”). For example, in an easy
credit environment or a credit bubble of the kind that led to the housing bubble and the financial crisis,
we would expect to see yield spreads contract, and in a tight credit market we would see widening of
credit spreads. See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 579 fig. 23.2 (see the period from
2003 to 2008 and the dramatic widening of the credit spreads).
131
LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 80.
132
For example, during the financial crisis, the CDS spreads of Boeing, General Electric, Disney,
and Dow Chemicals, which all traded within a narrow band of within 100 basis points, became
increasingly volatile, trading in a range of approximately 700 to 100 basis points. This was a
remarkable display of volatility for blue chip companies, even though only one of them, General
Electric through its division GE Capital, can arguably be said to be at its core a financial services firm.
See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 580 fig. 23.3.
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are dynamic. Thus, rating agencies would be replaced with another set of
monitors.
3. Proposals to Enhance Liability.—In the fields of criminal law and
torts, liability can be used to incentivize proper behavior.133 Traditionally,
rating agencies have been successful in defending against liability.134
Rating agencies have a judicially recognized First Amendment defense on
the basis that they are merely providing an opinion on a public matter.135
Absent actual malice, bad faith, or similar malfeasance, they can credibly
argue that they should be protected from onerous potential liability
whenever an issuer defaults and ex post fault is found in the agency’s rating
process or exercise of judgment.136 Recently, however, liability risk has
increased. The Dodd–Frank Act exposed rating agencies to Section 11
liability for material misstatements in the registration statement.137 Also, a
federal district court has permitted fraud claims to proceed to trial against
rating agencies for misleading ratings for structured finance bonds issued in
the time period of the financial crisis.138
133

See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
134
See Bai, supra note 7, at 286–90 (describing key cases).
135
See Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007); In
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 817–26 (S.D. Tex. 2005);
Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 1341, 1347 (D.
Colo. 1997), aff’d, 175 F.3d 848, 858 (10th Cir. 1999).
136
See Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 690 F.3d 98, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that
investors failed to present a claim for negligent misrepresentation and demonstrate privity of contract
with the rating agencies); Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Fin. Servs. LLC,
700 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2012) (dismissing complaint for negligent misrepresentation); First Equity
Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that rating agency
is not liable for incorrect information); In re Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 387 F. Supp. 902, 905
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that rating agency has no duty to verify statistical information relied upon to
provide rating).
137
Dodd–Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939G, 124 Stat.
1375, 1890 (2010). Previously, rating agencies were exempted under SEC Rule 436(g). Rating agencies
can still shield themselves from liability because Section 11 requires the naming and consent of the
expert. Section 11 requires that the expert “with his consent [has] been named as having prepared or
certified any part of the registration statement,” and that the “written consent” of named experts be filed
with the registration statement. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(4), 77g(a) (2006); see In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 183 n.11 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that despite the repeal of Rule 436(g),
rating agencies must still satisfy the naming and consent requirements of Section 11). In light of this,
Moody’s and other rating agencies have announced that they will not consent to the disclosure of their
ratings in the registration statements of new issues. See 2011 Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K, supra
note 53, at 18.
138
See King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305–12
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that credit ratings were subject to an actionable theory of misrepresentation);
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(denying in part summary judgment motions by Moody’s and S&P on fraud claims of some plaintiff
investors); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 176 (S.D.N.Y.
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Liability for malfeasance, such as fraud and bad faith, as a policy
matter is a given. But liability based on negligence or error cannot be a
significant part of fundamental reform. There is a structural issue.
Compensation cannot be the theory of liability based on fault.139 Typical
deals in the bond market can be enormous, sometimes into the billions of
dollars.140 As of 2010, the bond market was capitalized at $108 trillion.141
The parent companies of Moody’s and S&P have combined market
capitalizations of about $14 billion and $15 billion, respectively.142 This is a
maximum value exposure-to-market capitalization ratio of 4500-to-1. Of
course, this ratio is not “value at risk” in the sense of the formal financial
measure;143 the probability of the entire bond market being devalued to zero
would be nil. But even if the ratio overstates the matter quite a bit, it gives
a sense of proportion. The larger point is that “a single case could produce
a billion dollar (or greater) judgment,”144 thus crippling these firms that
serve a vital market function.145 Unlike most areas covered by accident law,
there is no liability insurance, and hedging the credit risk is impossible due
to simple economics: the revenue generated from rating is far less than the
CDS spread (in other words, the cost of insurance is greater than the
revenue generated from the activity insured against).146
If deterrence is the only plausible theory of liability, there is not yet a
coherent theory to impose liability on the credit rating industry. Liability
for bad faith and intentional malfeasance is an easy, undisputed issue.
When fraud is involved, rating agencies should not be able to hide behind
the First Amendment or contractual doctrines. But the much harder

2009) (rejecting a First Amendment defense for ratings of structured financed securities). It is worth
noting that these three trial court cases have all been handled by District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin.
139
Coffee, supra note 7, at 252–53.
140
For example, Apple Inc. recently made a $17 billion bond issue. Katy Burne & Mike Cherney,
Apple’s Record Plunge into Debt Pool, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2013, at C1.
141
See supra note 20.
142
McGraw Hill Financial, Inc. (MHFI), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=MHFI&ql=0
(last visited Nov. 21, 2013); Moody’s Corp. (MCO), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=
MCO&ql=1 (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
143
“Value at risk” or VaR is defined as “the maximum loss that can be incurred with a given
probability.” SERGIO M. FOCARDI & FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL MODELING
AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 748 (2004).
144
Coffee, supra note 7, at 252.
145
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to
Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1700–01 (2006) (noting that
after Arthur Andersen, the federal government has been reluctant to prosecute other accounting firms
for fear of destroying the limited number of large accounting firms, as the Enron prosecution did for
Arthur Andersen).
146
The typical fee for a corporate bond issue is in the range of 4–5 basis points. LANGOHR &
LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 413. On the other hand, CDS spreads are far in excess of this level even for
blue chip companies. See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 580 fig. 23.3 (showing CDS
premium rates).
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question is whether there is common space between a theory of deterrence
and liability based on negligence, incompetence, or laziness (i.e., the worst
types of conduct that would still be excusable under the business judgment
rule in corporate law147), such as demonstrable errors of judgment and
analysis or lack of effort based on some objective standard. From a cost–
benefit framework for analyzing accidents,148 the point at which the
marginal benefit of better credit ratings equals the marginal cost of
precautions is not immediately clear. One could reasonably guess that this
calculation weighs in favor of additional marginal investment in
precautions because the cost of the harm (potentially billions of dollars in
bond values at stake) is so great. But this could mean that the theory of
deterrence may result in liability up to the point of diminishing the rating
agencies as viable investments by shareholders. The implication could
mean that rating agencies should be pure public goods without a profit
motive, but this cannot be the answer unless one is willing to accept the
extreme view that rating agencies should be nationalized. The threat of
monetary sanctions must be calibrated to affect incentives, proper
performance, and financial viability of these important firms. One suspects
that in a high-volume, multi-trillion dollar industry with billions of dollars
in fees earned annually, getting a theoretically correct calibrated level of
sanctions right would be a difficult endeavor for regulators and courts. A
properly calibrated legal standard may not be consistent with the operation
of private firms in this area.
4. Proposals to Impose Alternative Compensation Models.—Several
other proposals seek to impose the proper incentives on rating agencies
147

See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational,’ provides no
ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l,
Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“If, however, corporate directors were to be found liable for
a corporate loss from a risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky (foolishly risky!
stupidly risky! egregiously risky!—you supply the adverb), their liability would be joint and several for
the whole loss . . . .”); WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 231 (4th ed. 2012) (“[D]isinterested directors who act deliberately and in
good faith should never be liable for a resulting loss, no matter how stupid their decisions may seem ex
post.”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1672 (2001) (suggesting that directors will not
be held liable for “pretty dumb” decisions); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and
Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675,
676 (2002) (“[I]t shields directors who follow the requisite procedures from liability even when they
make reckless, foolish, and downright stupid decisions.”). See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Tort
Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139 (2013) (arguing
that tort principles have a role to play in corporation law).
148
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 133, at 55–60; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 19–21 (1987).
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through change in compensation as the key to reform.149 One proposal is to
empower the government to make the engagement decisions for issuers.150
This was embodied in the Franken Amendment to the Dodd–Frank Act,
which was never passed. It would have required a government agent to
choose the rating agency for structured finance issues, though the issuer
would remain free to select a second rating agency.151 The Franken
Amendment was watered down in the Dodd–Frank Act to a provision
requiring the SEC to study the feasibility of a scheme,152 but Congress gave
the SEC the power to adopt such a scheme if the latter deemed it necessary
and appropriate.153 This proposal would minimize the inherent conflict of
interest because issuers no longer have the power to “shop” for ratings.
However, it poses a new problem. It is unclear how a government agent
would select the engagement—randomly, sequentially, or through some
assessment of quality, perhaps. On a deeper level, since the assignment of
engagements would determine market share, how would the market share
of each firm be determined? Market share could become ossified if
assignments were made based on current market share. Alternatively, the
government agent, upon determining the relative quality of firms, could
alter market share in favor of one firm over the other. Neither option is
palatable for obvious reasons.
Another proposal is to switch to an investor-pay model.154 An investorpay model comes in different varieties, such as a mandatory subscriptionbased model or a user-fee model.155 Proposals in this vein are problematic
for a number of reasons. An investor-pay model would simply reverse the
polarity of the current structural bias in favor of the issuer toward a bias in
favor of bondholders or subscribers.156 Instead of overrated bonds, we may
have underrated bonds. Furthermore, as noted above, some commentators
have even suggested that bondholders actually wanted overrated bonds.157
149

See Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 94; Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform,
supra note 7, at 794.
150
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 256 (describing the model). A variant of this proposal is to assign
engagements randomly or by rotation. These variations confront the same problems. Also, “the problem
with such a system is that it creates little incentive for rating agencies to compete based on the quality
of their ratings.” Id. at 258.
151
See id. at 257–58 (describing the amendment); Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, supra note 7, at
146–47 (same).
152
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 939F(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1375, 1889 (2010).
153
Id. § 939F(d).
154
See, e.g., Grundfest & Hochenberg, supra note 7 (proposing an investor-owned rating agency);
Manns, Rating Risk, supra note 7 (proposing a user-fee model).
155
See GAO 2012 REPORT, supra note 8, at 9–14 (providing summary of alternative compensation
models).
156
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 255 (“Investors also have biases that can create conflicts for rating
agencies . . . .”).
157
See supra Part I.B.
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There is a question of whether the incentive created by an investor-pay
model would produce the most accurate ratings.
A deeper problem is that a user-fee or subscription-based model may
not be economically feasible for rating agencies.158 Rating agencies cannot
capture the full economic value of their product because once credit ratings
are disclosed to some paying investors, there will always be free riders,159
or the costs of rating services may be reduced by agreements to share
ratings among users or subscribers. These business problems prompted
rating agencies to change their business models to an issuer-pay model.160
Commentators have argued that rating agencies “probably could not persist
at their current scale of operations without the issuer-pays model, and may
not survive its loss.”161 A fundamental change in the compensation model
mandates a dramatic change in the business models of large, publicly held
rating agencies that have existed for a long time, which is no small matter.
In perhaps the most creative proposal on the compensation front, some
commentators have proposed that rating agencies be paid with the debt they
rate.162 An economic stake tied to performance would incentivize rating
agencies to provide higher quality ratings. While debt compensation might
reduce the incentive to overrate the issue, an economic stake in the issue
may incentivize rating agencies to underrate the issue. This proposal
correctly frames the larger perspective: the link between compensation and
incentive, and at the same time the infeasibility of moving away from the
issuer-pay model as a matter of practicality and politics of regulation.
However, the proposal is infeasible. It does not work if rating agencies
could sell the debt and the right to receive the debt immediately.163 If they
are subject to a lockup, this obligation would create significant business
and financial problems.164 Depriving rating agencies of cash revenue may
significantly disrupt operations.165 Rating agencies are not in the business of
158

See Coffee, supra note 7, at 255; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 571–72.
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 255; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 582; see also LANGOHR
& LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 412.
160
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 255 & n.66; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 571–72;
Gudzowski, supra note 106, at 254–55. Due to financial difficulties, the rating agencies changed their
business model to the issuer-pay compensation model during the 1940–1960 time period. Fitzpatrick &
Sagers, supra note 7, at 571–72.
161
Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 571. Fitzpatrick and Sagers further note that the decline of
equity security research by investment banks evinces the infeasibility of subscription-based
compensation models of securities research operations. Id. at 571–72 & n.46; see also Coffee, supra
note 7, at 259 (“Securities analysts have similarly found investors resistant to paying for investment
advice.”).
162
See Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 94.
163
Coffee, supra note 7, at 254.
164
See id. at 253–54 (noting liquidity problems).
165
For example, in 2012 Moody’s incurred operating expenses of $1.65 billion, most of which
were paid in cash. MOODY’S CORP., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (2012), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MOOD/2476041436x0x643051/E0E15B0E-744C-44CD-B56B159
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holding a portfolio of bonds.166 Even if they were required to hold a
portfolio of debt, much of the envisioned incentive could be undermined
through hedging strategies on the portfolio of bonds held by the rating
agencies, unless these investment activities were concomitantly prohibited.
*

*

*

The above overview demonstrates that the problem of credit rating
agencies has been difficult to fix. Many of the proposals are sweeping in
scope and call for dramatic reconfiguration of the industry or regulatory
scheme. Others simply would not work. As such, these previous proposals
raise serious questions of feasibility and practicability. The problem of
credit rating agency incentive has not been fixed.
II. PROPOSAL FOR A COMPENSATION COMPETITION
A. Properly Conceptualizing Competition and Incentive
In addressing the problems of the credit rating industry, the goal of
regulation should not be to radically restructure a preexisting, multi-billion
dollar industry. Instead, with minimal intrusion, the law should create the
necessary conditions to stimulate robust competition where currently the
market does not work well due to cozy cooperative relationships among
nominal competitors. In this respect, proper incentive is the condition
precedent to robust, positive competition.
The basic problem is not the lack of strong competition per se.
Competition can be good or bad. Many competitors working under an
issuer-pay model would run the risk of devolving into a race to the bottom
to gain business from issuers.167 In parsimoniously granting NRSRO status,
the SEC may have been right to be concerned about negative competition
among fledgling firms without strong history, resources, or reputation
capital.168 Strong competition is good only if it incentivizes a race to excel.
Competition is not the end, but is the means.

CF72F02CD9B7/MCO_2012_Annual_Report_vFINAL.pdf. The balance sheet shows that Moody’s
had only $555 million of accounts payable. Id. at 67.
166
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 254 n.64 (noting that the proposal could convert rating agencies
into “inadvertent” investment companies subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940).
167
Compare Coffee, supra note 7, at 247 (noting that the SEC was parsimonious in granting
NRSRO status because “it feared that new and ‘fly-by-night’ rating agencies would be more generous
in awarding investment grade ratings and thereby lead a race to the bottom”), with D. Daniel Sokol &
James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
45, 68–69 (2011) (suggesting that the evidence is mixed on whether industry concentration in banking
tends to stabilize or destabilize the financial markets).
168
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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Any reform measure must solve the incentive problem. Reputation
capital notwithstanding, there is not a strong incentive to improve the
quality of credit ratings when the market is concentrated among a few
competitors whose business interests are well protected by regulatory
licenses, natural barriers to entry, and the benefits of market share—a cozy,
profitable arrangement for rating agencies.
Poor quality credit ratings are not the inevitable outcome of a
concentrated industry. Positive, robust competition can be achieved if the
incentives are properly structured. Consider a simple analogy in sports.
Competition can be fierce either when there are many competitors, e.g., a
golf championship or a marathon, or when there are just two competitors,
e.g., a chess or tennis match. In the latter, competition is fierce because it is
structured as a winner-take-all, zero-sum game. The problem in the credit
rating industry is that all three major firms consistently and concurrently
win since the engagement of one is not done to the exclusion of the others
and usually involves an engagement of the others as well.169 From a game
theory perspective, the firms stand more in a cooperative posture with each
other than in a competitive one because they are essentially partner
monopolists.170
The game must change from a win–win to a win–lose outcome—or at
least a portion of the game must be so.
B. Mandating Pay-for-Performance
A pay-for-performance mechanism in compensation would foster
vigorous competition among Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. This claim assumes
that firms do not like to lose when forced to compete, the outcome of which
is directly connected to profits. This assumption is empirically sound.
The problem in the credit rating industry is similar to the problem of
corporate governance, where some scholars have argued that executive pay
is not as strongly linked to performance as it could be. The idea of pay-forperformance has broad support, at least in the academy, in the field of
executive compensation.171 Prominent scholars have argued that the
disjunction between pay and performance has led to inefficiency and real
169

I do not advocate the elimination of the double-engagement industry practice for three reasons:
(1) double engagements provide additional information to the market, (2) a rule of single engagement
does not diminish the concern of structural bias in the issuer-pay model, and (3) the number of
engagements seems to be an appropriate private choice and there are insufficient reasons for
government intrusion into the choice of an issuer seeking a second opinion. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR,
supra note 1, at 63 (“As long as each one provides its own judgment about it—independent and in
different ways from its competitors—the combined information to the market in the split ratings should
be valuable extra information to investors.”).
170
See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (describing Moody’s and S&P as a “partnermonopoly”); Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, supra note 7, at 138.
171
See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
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costs for corporations.172 In the credit rating industry, a pay-forperformance scheme does not naturally arise due to the unique aspects of
the credit rating industry: a duopoly plus industrial organization, issuer-pay
compensation model, and industry practice of using multiple rating
agencies in a single issue.173 Each factor undermines competitiveness with
easy profits and regulatory rents; collectively they suppress the incentive to
excel. Accordingly, the condition for competition through pay-forperformance incentives must be created through regulatory mandate.
My proposal assumes that the industrial structure and practices remain
the same. It does not depend on a radical move away from the issuer-pay
model. The amount of fees, payment forms, and other transactional
considerations remain private matters. However, rating agencies should be
made to bond their performance. This can be accomplished without a
heavy-handed regulatory intrusion. Only a marginal adjustment to the
issuer-pay model is needed. The pay-for-performance scheme entails the
creation of a mandatory performance bonus. It is a hybrid public–private
compensation scheme. For the portion of the revenue not ceded, the
compensation scheme would be determined by private actors, but the ceded
revenue would constitute a publicly administered compensation plan.
To start, I limit participation to Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch (I later show
how participation can be expanded to promote and incubate other rating
agencies174). The three rating agencies would submit a small portion of their
revenue to fund a bonus pool of deferred compensation, an incentive bonus.
For illustrative purposes, let’s assume a bonus pool based on a small 5% of
accrued revenue.175 At regular intervals,176 the performance of each agency
would be statistically evaluated by an independent agency based upon
regulatory disclosure requirements that for the most part are already in
place.177 If insufficient, these requirements can be supplemented with
additional SEC rules, but the regulatory oversight of the rating agencies
would be limited to independent confirmation of performance.178 Upon
evaluation, the best performer is identified and the incentive bonus would
be awarded on a winner-take-all basis.
This scheme has a technical problem that must first be solved. As
suggested, the contribution must be based on a fixed percentage of revenue,
172

See id.
See supra Part I.B.
174
See infra Part II.D.
175
See infra Part II.C (providing data and analysis showing how 5% is feasible).
176
The data must be sufficient to make a reasonable determination of statistical performance. Thus,
a multiyear period is probably needed.
177
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2012) (providing for the maintenance of data and information on
credit ratings and experience); id. § 240.17g-3 (providing for annual financial reports to SEC).
178
This scheme would be in addition to other forms of regulation already in place, including
liability under the securities laws. See supra Part I.C.
173
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and not on a common flat contribution of $X. Each firm is different in size
and earns different revenue amounts in any given year.179 A fixed
contribution does not work because the amount has relative value to each
firm, and thus incentives and financial effects are not symmetric. This is
less of a problem between Moody’s and S&P, which are comparable in
scale, but Fitch is a much smaller firm.180 Since Fitch is a significant player,
it must be a part of the scheme. The contribution must be a fixed
percentage of revenue, which would result in different contribution
amounts by each firm. This rule creates its own technical problem: how do
we equitably and symmetrically allocate the bonus in light of the different
contributions made?
The scheme should permit different levels of contribution in a threeway game, but always maintain a 1-to-1 payout ratio. There is a simple
solution to the problem. The condition is met only when there are two
concurrently played subgames within the larger competition. The “main
game” would involve a three-way competition with the bonus amount
calculated as three times the contribution of the smallest player. The “side
game” would involve a two-way competition with the bonus amount
calculated as the contribution in excess of the main-game allocation. Since
the side game would be between the two larger players only, the ceded
revenue is capped at the revenue contribution of the second-largest player.
In a multiplayer game, these rules maintain a 1-to-1 payout ratio as to all
players, thus maintaining fairness and symmetry of economic stakes.181
An example illustrates how the proposed rules work. Assume that 5%
of revenue for S, M, and F are 120, 100, and 50. Since S is the largest
player, it can only contribute 100, which is the contribution of the second179

See infra Table 4 and note 184.
In 2012, Moody’s earned revenue of $1958 million, and S&P earned revenue of $2034 million.
2012 Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 38; The McGraw-Hill Cos., Annual Report
for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-1023, at 28 [hereinafter 2012
McGraw-Hill Form 10-K]. In 2011, Fitch earned revenue of €525.7 million, which at a $1.30-to-€1.00
exchange rate is $683 million. FIMALAC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 102 (2012). (At the time of this
writing, Fimalac’s 2012 annual report was unavailable.)
181
This scheme is similar to the payout rules in no-limit poker. See DAVID SKLANSKY, THE
THEORY OF POKER 3–4 (4th ed. 2007). In no limit poker, a player can bet any amount she has at the
table, but if the opponent has a smaller sum at the table, the “action” (play) between the two is only for
the smaller sum wagered between the two players. Id. The player with the greater funds can make
additional bets with other players who can match her bets. For example, suppose players A, B, and C
have, respectively, 100, 80, and 60 at the table. Player A cannot “chase away” B and C from a hand just
because she has greater funds at the table to wager. If A bets “all in” with 100, B and C can “call” the
bet, but they can only bet the table stakes of 80 and 60. The main pot is for 180, which is the
contribution of 60 from each player. The amount of 20 is returned to A since B can only match A’s bet
up to 80. A side pot of 40 is created for the winner between A and B (C does not participate because he
lacks the funds). If C has the best hand among the three, C wins 180, which is a 1-to-1 payout of the
amount he bet. If B has the second best hand, B wins the side pot of 40. Player A is the big loser with a
net loss of 80. Player B bet 60 and gained 40 for a net loss of 20. Player C bet 60 and gained 180 for a
net gain of 120.
180
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largest player, M. The smallest player, F, contributes 50. The total bonus
pool is 250. The allocation is based on the following rules: the winner in
the main game among S, M, and F gets 150; the winner in the side game
between S and M gets 100. If S or M wins outright against all competitors,
it would win the main and side games and thus collect 250. If F wins the
main game, it would get 150, but since F did not contribute to the side
game it is precluded from this game. There would still be a side game
between S and M, who have staked additional funds, for the 100.
We can apply these simple allocation rules to a compensation
competition among Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. Suppose firms S, M, and F
earn these revenues: S(s), M(m), and F(f) where s > m > f. Since S earns
the most revenue of the three players, it needs to contribute only m, the
contribution of the second-largest player. In each competition period, the
payoffs and losses can be generalized as follows:
TABLE 1: MODEL OF PAYOUTS

There would always be a three-way “main game” in which Moody’s,
S&P, and Fitch compete for these stakes: (1) if Fitch wins, three times
Fitch’s contribution; or (2) if Moody’s or S&P wins, the entire bonus pool.
If Fitch wins the main game, there would always be a “side game” between
Moody’s and S&P for the contributions they made into the bonus pool in
excess of Fitch’s bonus.
The side game can yield a net win or a net loss, depending on the size
of Fitch’s contribution relative to those of Moody’s and S&P. Under
current financial performance measures, winning the side game would
result in a net gain because Fitch’s contribution would be much smaller.
However, if the three competitors are similar sizes, winning the side game
may result in a net loss.
For example, assume that the ceded revenues are S = 100, M = 100,
F = 40 (thus, the total bonus pool is 240), and that F wins the main game
and S wins the side game. The results would be:
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TABLE 2: EXAMPLE OF POSITIVE PAYOUT FROM SIDE GAME

Since the side-game allocation between S and M is large enough to
offset the loss of ceded revenue, S is a net winner even though it lost the
main game.
Now, assume that the ceded revenues are S = 100, M = 100, F = 80
(thus, the total bonus pool is 280), and again F wins the main game and S
wins the side game. The results would be:
TABLE 3: EXAMPLE OF NEGATIVE PAYOUT FROM SIDE GAME

Here, even after winning the side game, S is a net loser because F has
won most of the bonus pool by winning the main game.
Thus, the side game is meaningful to the two losers of the main
game, and the winner can either net a gain or mitigate a loss, depending on
the smaller competitor’s contribution of ceded revenue.
Under the above rules, all three rating agencies will always have
“skin in the game.” The game is perfect from the perspective of symmetric
incentives and equities among players of disparate wealth contributions.
Importantly, the competition is zero sum and the “awards” are self-funded.
C. Financial and Economic Analyses
The creation of a bonus pool raises two questions: (1) What is the
financial effect of the proposal? (2) What is the economic theory of the
incentive? The financial analysis goes to the issue of economic and
business feasibility, which in turn is relevant to legal feasibility as well.
The economic analysis goes to the issue of efficiency. I will address these
issues in turn.
1. Financial Effects of the Proposal.—In the above discussion, I use
an illustrative bonus amount of 5%. Based on public information found in
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the annual reports of Moody’s Corporation and McGraw Hill (S&P’s
parent company), we can get a sense of the monetary stakes involved. In
the following table, I provide simple data on financial and valuation
metrics for each firm.182
TABLE 4: FINANCIAL DATA ON MOODY’S AND S&P

Firm value is defined as market capitalization plus long-term debt.183
Operating income is claimed by equity and debt capital providers.
Accordingly, the multiple of firm value to operating income provides a
metric of valuation based on how much equity and debt are valued based
182

See 2012 McGraw-Hill Form 10-K, supra note 180, at 28, 49, 51; 2012 Moody’s Corporation
Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 38, 65, 67; FIMALAC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 180, at 102. At
the time of this writing (and as of July 6, 2013), Fimalac’s 2012 annual report was unavailable, and thus
2011 figures are used. Moody’s is a part of Moody’s Corporation, a publicly traded company (NYSE:
MCO). S&P is a part of McGraw Hill Financial, Inc., a publicly traded corporation (NYSE: MHFI).
Fitch is 50% owned by Fimalac, S.A., a publicly traded French company (Euronext Paris: FIM), and
50% owned by Hearst Corp. On March 22, 2013, McGraw Hill Companies sold its educational
publishing business, and reorganized as McGraw Hill Financial. Market capitalization figures were
from yahoo.com/finance as of the specific date, and for McGraw Hill the market capitalization is the
pre-restructuring figure. The revenue and operating profit figures are the segmentation results of the
credit rating business units, which are found in the Form 10-Ks, and not the consolidated results of the
parent companies. Fitch is not included in these calculations because Moody’s and S&P each are more
than twice as big as Fitch. A comparison of Moody’s and S&P, the two duopolists, suffices to illustrate
the point. One observation needs to be noted. The United States’ civil action against McGraw Hill, filed
on February 4, 2013, significantly depressed the stock prices of both McGraw Hill and Moody’s. On
February 1, Moody’s and McGraw Hill closed at $55.35 and $58.34. YAHOO! FIN.,
http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) (providing historic stock prices). On February 5,
Moody’s and McGraw Hill closed at $45.09 and $44.92. These declines in share price lower the
valuation multiples.
183
I used firm value to operating income as the valuation metric rather than price to earnings
because McGraw Hill was undergoing a restructuring to create McGraw Hill Financial (see supra note
182) that made its net income figures unreliable. See 2012 McGraw-Hill Form 10-K, supra note 180, at
5–7 (describing the restructuring process); The McGraw-Hill Cos., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year
Ended Dec. 31, 2011 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-1023, at 9 [hereinafter 2011 McGraw-Hill Form 10-K]
(same).
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on each dollar of operating income. This multiple, an average of 11.8x
operating income, is used to determine how much equity value is deducted
or gained from losing or winning the compensation game.
Based on the above data and method, Moody’s and McGraw Hill
would each cede approximately $98 million in revenue in any given year
(5% of Moody’s 2012 revenue, which is only slightly less than S&P’s
revenue). If either Moody’s or S&P wins, the revenue gained would be
$196 million from their ceded revenues plus Fitch’s contribution of $34
million.184 Assume that operating expenses would be unaffected by a 5%
revenue charge because the same amount of operating expenses would be
needed to generate 100% of the revenue irrespective of subsequent ceding
of revenue.185 This means that for Moody’s and S&P the total annual stake
in the compensation game would be $230 million in potential augmentation
to operate income, or $132 million net of the ceded revenue. These
incentives alone constitute a large pot of money—and significant incentive
to win the competition on a recurring basis.
Based on these simple assumptions, if either Moody’s or S&P were
to continually lose the competition to the other such that it would incur a
perpetual loss of 5% ceded revenue, and if the valuation multiples remain
static, the implied loss of equity value would be approximately $1156
million (= $98 million × 11.8). On the other hand, if a firm earns the
performance bonus on a perpetual basis by continually beating the other
and the multiples remain static, it would add to its equity value
approximately $1557 million (= $132 million × 11.8). The theoretical range
of potential value change would be a spread of about $2.7 billion.186
This $2.7 billion spread range is only a theoretical outer limit
because we do not expect perpetual losses for either firm. In a robust
competition, no firm will always win or lose. The actual range of potential
valuation effects will be much tighter (perhaps a negligible sum for the
reasons explained below). Nevertheless, in any competition period there
would be substantial economic stake in winning the rating competition. For
a firm that consistently wins the competition, the market will eventually
factor in a performance expectation that will result in a valuation premium
relative to the other two firms.
Since a ceding of revenue deducts from the top line, and winning
creates variance in profitability, a question is whether there are valuation
184

FIMALAC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 180, at 102. Fitch earned revenue of €525.7
million, and its 5% contribution is calculated as: €525.7 × 5% × $1.30/€1.00 = $34.2 million. Id.
185
I relax this assumption in the economic analysis that follows because changing incentives may
change resource allocation decisions in the firms, which may affect profit and loss.
186
In all likelihood, if a firm continues to lose the competition, valuation would adjust in a way
that discounts the expected return of the ceded revenue and the multiple would contract as the market
would see the firm as inferior to the winner, which would likely receive a multiple premium. Thus, the
theoretical range would be greater than $2.7 billion, which assumes static valuations.
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implications of imposing this potential financial cost on firms. The
valuation calculation must consider the incremental variability of earnings
and cash flow resulting from the competition. Increased variance would
negatively affect the firm’s cost of capital such that we may see a potential
valuation contraction for both firms. If so, the competition may not
necessarily be a zero-sum game. Moody’s and McGraw Hill may suffer a
combined decrease in market value. The loss net market value of the
combined firms would result in a social cost on one side of the ledger,
which must be considered as a cost of regulation.
However, it is unlikely that we would see a net loss in value for two
reasons. First, the 5% is always ceded, which means that the mandatory
contribution reduces revenue but does not add variance to a firm’s financial
results. The ceded revenue is a fixed obligation like overhead. Since
variance results when a firm wins the bonus, it is skewed toward positive
outcomes. Second, exposure to risk from the competition can be reduced to
zero through perfect hedging. A shareholder needs to buy one share each in
the three firms of the duopoly plus to fully invest in the credit rating sector.
This investment strategy perfectly diversifies the unique risk of each firm
with respect to the bonus. In other words, a diversified investor would
assume no greater volatility of earnings or cash flow due to the zero-sum
nature of the compensation game.187 Thus, there is no significant loss of
value from the proposal.
The next question is whether the 5% figure is feasible as a business
proposition. The answer is clearly “yes.” A review of the financial
performances of Moody’s and S&P shows that there is substantial room to
impose a mandatory contribution. Below are the 2012 revenue, operating
profit, and operating margin of Moody’s, S&P, Goldman Sachs, Accenture,
Lazard, and FTI Consulting.188 These firms operate in different industry
sectors, but they provide significant professional advisory services.
Goldman Sachs is a leading investment bank, and Accenture, Lazard, and
FTI are leading advisory businesses. The following table provides financial
data on these companies as compared to Moody’s and S&P.189
187

If Fitch is introduced into consideration, an investor can easily invest in the three firms as a unit,
thus reducing variance of cash flow to zero.
188
More detailed information about these companies is available on their company websites and
Form 10-Ks. I selected Accenture, Lazard, and FTI because these firms represent a wide range of
consulting practices. Accenture is a large firm with a strategic-management and technology focus.
Lazard is an investment bank, but its primary business is M&A advisory services. FTI provides a wide
array of services including economic and litigation consulting. The FTI operating profit was adjusted to
add back $110.3 million of a goodwill impairment charge recognized in 2012. FTI Consulting, Inc.,
Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-14875, at 79
[hereinafter 2012 FTI Form 10-K].
189
2012 FTI Form 10-K, supra note 188, at 79; The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Annual Report for
the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-14965, at 117; Accenture plc, Annual
Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Aug. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-34448, at F-4; LAZARD,
2012 ANNUAL REPORT 77 (2013).
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TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL DATA

Moody’s and S&P have high operating profit margins compared to
the above leading firms. Keep in mind that they are different businesses,
but the different levels of financial performance are stark. A ceding rate of
5% would have significant impact on any business (of course), but the
important takeaway is that on the whole the rating agencies would not be
financially threatened in any way. Indeed, if the operating profits of
advisory services are the benchmark (7%–13%), the rating agencies could
cede as much as 25% of revenue and still be within the range of financial
feasibility. Thus, there is a small impact on margins and financial
operations, but as the above analysis also shows, the rating agencies would
have substantial economic incentive to win the game because 5% ceded
revenue is still a lot of money at stake.
2. Economic Theory of the Proposal.—We see that there is wide
financial room to mandate participation. This raises the question of whether
there is a theory of the optimal level of ceded revenue. The first principle is
business feasibility. We should not impose an amount that risks financial
distress. This is not a great concern because rating agencies enjoy such
healthy profits. That Fitch is significantly smaller in terms of revenue and
profits does not present a problem because the equities can be made to be
symmetric with equal-allocation rules.
The more serious question concerns the relationship between private
profits and public gains. Due to the lack of competition, rating agencies
have not exerted the sufficient effort or insufficiently invested in the
business to provide the best credit ratings, or both.190 Clearly, since they do
190

See supra notes 41, 49 and accompanying text (providing accounts of lack of diligence); see
also Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What
Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd–Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243,
1303 (2011) (“What is particularly shocking is the lack of due diligence done by the rating agencies in
connection with issuing AAA ratings, from which they collected hefty fees.”); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 514 n.157 (2012) (“[R]ating agencies have not
historically engaged in due diligence, focusing solely on risk assessment from information provided.”).
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not stand to lose business, these investment decisions have been profitable;
but equally clearly, they have resulted in public harms. Thus, we should
explore the relationship among the cost of effort and investment, social
benefit of better credit ratings, and the incentive to make the investment
based on short-term consideration of winning the bonus and the long-term
financial and reputational consideration of losing consistently to other
competitors. Applying a standard cost–benefit analysis, we can set the
bonus such that the marginal benefit of better quality outcomes equals the
increased investment of effort and capital, capped at the point of significant
increase in the risk of financial distress. This is a simple principle, but
achieving it may be more difficult.
This calculus is a bit more complicated because the cost–benefit
analysis from a social welfare perspective is dependent on the private
incentives of rating agencies in determining whether to make the
investment necessary to win. The variables of this private cost–benefit
analysis that drive each firm’s behavior are: (1) the probability distribution
of winning based on incremental efforts made, (2) the expected value of
investment and return, (3) game theoretic considerations on opposing
firms’ efforts to win and their iterative effects on one’s expected value, and
(4) costs of “opting out” of the game by taking the 95% of revenue and
conceding any effort to win by not investing in any effort at all. From a
game perspective, the competition can be played competitively or perhaps
cooperatively in which players agree to make the minimal investments to
maintain the status quo. For reasons explained infra Part III.A., I do not
think that the interactions will lead to collusive behavior. The rating
agencies would not collusively agree to “opt out” because this arrangement
would be highly unstable. Where the equilibrium lies in these calculations
when all of these factors are considered is difficult to predict.
The above sets forth the economic theory of the incentive amount. In
practice, policymakers must make a qualitative judgment based on findings
of facts on the level of investments already made, the amount of
investments that can be made, and the potential benefits in higher quality
ratings. Intuitively and without more data of the kind that would be relied
upon by policymakers, the optimal point is in the range of feasibility based
on 2012 financial measures of 5% to 25%. It seems that within this range,
greater investments would yield greater marginal returns on investments as
measured by quality of ratings. If the rating agencies choose to compete
through increased investments in credit ratings, profits may decline.
Reduced profitability may be a private loss, but not a social cost if the
return on more accurate credit ratings exceeds the cost of additional
investment in human capital.191 The difference between the current rating
191

Rating agencies might have strategically chosen not to compete against investment banks for
human capital, and as a result the necessary investments were not made toward achieving “state of the
art” quality in credit ratings. See Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 7, at 81.
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agency profit levels and lower profits in the investment banking and
advisory industries may represent the regulatory rents rating agencies earn
from the current state of the industrial organization.192
D. Toward a Robust Secondary Market
The above proposal applies only to the duopoly plus. In this section, I
suggest that the same structure can be used to promote a robust secondary
market for credit ratings among newer, less-established rating agencies.
The core idea here is that competition can be enhanced by creating an
information market on credit ratings in which other rating agencies can
make financial bets against the bonus pool.
The market would work like this. Any smaller or newer NRSRO
interested in issuing a rating would be given the same information as a
rating agency that has been engaged by the issuer to provide a rating. Some
regulatory precursors are already in place. Rule 17g-5 mandates an equal
access obligation for ratings of structured finance securities.193 If an issuer
provides a rating agency information for a structured finance instrument, it
must make the same information available to other NRSROs to enable
them to issue their own ratings. This rule was intended to foster
competition among NRSROs.194 The Dodd–Frank Act eliminates the
exemption rating agencies enjoyed from Regulation FD,195 which requires
that when an issuer discloses material, nonpublic information to certain
individuals or entities (generally, securities market professionals, such as
stock analysts) the issuer must also make public disclosure of that
information.196 Thus, some of the key regulations to achieve information
access and parity have already been implemented.
With the necessary information, any rating agency can provide an
unsolicited credit rating. Frequently, newer and smaller rating agencies are
compelled to provide unsolicited credit ratings to break into the market and
establish a reputation.197 Consistent with current market practice, the issuer
would not otherwise be forced to pay for the rating from a rating agency it
has not engaged, and the rating agency would incur its own costs in
192

This may explain why famed investor Warren Buffett made a substantial investment in
Moody’s. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 6, at 207 (“Buffett said that he invested
in the company because the rating agency business was ‘a natural duopoly,’ which gave it ‘incredible’
pricing power—and ‘the single-most important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power.’”).
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17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 (2012).
194
Coffee, supra note 7, at 248. “Of the 318,056 outstanding credit ratings for asset-backed
securities” at the time of measurement, “all but 17,604 [were] issued by” firms other than the duopoly
plus. SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.
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Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939B,
124 Stat. 1375, 1887–88 (2010).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100. The exemption for rating agencies is found in 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100(b)(2)(iii).
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See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 410, 423–26.
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providing the rating. However, the rating would become a part of a
portfolio of ratings that would be evaluated against the ratings provided by
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. If the rating agency outperforms these big three
agencies that are mandated to participate in the bonus pool, it would be
paid back its expenses plus profit based on a reasonable rate of return from
the bonus pool.198 The remainder of the bonus pool would go to the winner
of the main competition among the duopoly plus. This bonus would
constitute a subsidy to newer and smaller competitors that have taken risks
and proven their worth.
This incubation program has several functions. First, it permits
smaller competitors to compete in the information market even without
engagements from issuers and their investment bankers. They are not
economically frozen out, but they are also not undeserving beneficiaries of
a subsidy, either. The competition is not a free ride to the smaller
competitors since they are providing free rating services with only the hope
of recovering expenses and profit upon outperforming larger, more
established competitors. Second, smaller rating agencies confront high
natural barriers to market entry. They may be uncompetitive in the labor
market for finance professionals. New rating agencies also face a Catch-22
situation in which they must have a reputation for competence, adequacy of
resources, longevity, and experience to get engagements.199 Thus far, the
SEC has not been able to resolve these problems. A program of shadow
competition provides opportunities for smaller rating agencies to gain
experience and a history of success, thus building the essential reputation
capital that is needed to obtain regular engagements from issuers. Third, a
more robust information market on credit ratings is superior to a state of
less information. This is why issuers seek double ratings. It is logical that
the credit market would benefit from multiple assessments of a particular
issue’s creditworthiness issued by rating agencies with an incentive to
provide the most accurate rating.
An incubation program is a pathway for smaller rating agencies to
learn, grow, and compete. Eventually they may graduate to the “big
leagues” and earn a seat at the main compensation game. Even though
reputation and client lists take time to develop, there is precedent for such a
move. Fitch was once a smaller firm, but it has gained significant market
share through a specialization in international and structured finance
issues.200 Also, A.M. Best is a small firm, but has a very good reputation in
198

The setting of rate of return or a reasonable profit is seen in other contexts. For example, the
rates of profit for public utilities are regulated. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mo. Gas Energy v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 186 S.W.3d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
199
See Coffee, supra note 7, at 234 (“Quite simply, the ‘Catch-22’ for new entrants is that it is
nearly impossible to obtain clients unless one has a track record for reliable ratings, yet such a track
record is difficult to generate unless one first has clients.”).
200
See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 398–402 (describing the growth of Fitch).
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the special niche of insurance businesses. Smaller firms can grow to be
significant competitors, but they require incubation, business opportunities
with economic rewards, and a track record of success.
This secondary market would enhance competition by enlarging the
pool of competitors.201 It would diminish the importance of the size and
financial strength of the three largest rating agencies because the smaller
rating agencies need not be engaged by issuers to compete against the big
rating agencies and they could compete at the level possible for their
financial condition. Here again, all players would be playing for stakes
fixed as a function of their individual financial conditions, thus giving each
player a chance to earn its proportional payout in the game. A secondary
market would create a situation in which the largest rating agencies could
lose a portion of their combined revenue to an outside rating agency.
III. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION
A. Coordination and Collusion
In light of the duopoly plus industry structure, one concern may be
whether rating agencies would implicitly coordinate or collude.202 When
forced to compete for economic gain, the three rating agencies may be
tempted to take a “one for you, one for me” collusive approach to the bonus
payment. Forced competition requires greater effort and quite probably
greater investments that reduce profit. In a zero-sum game, the desire to
maintain the status quo and signal détente would be great. This is not a
serious concern.
At the firm level, tacit coordination may appear possible due to the
limited number of competitors, but as a practical matter such a feat would
be difficult to execute. The situation here is not akin to price fixing in
which only a few decisions by a few actors would be needed to coordinate
with other firms. In a rating agency, such centralized decisionmaking does
not exist. Each rating agency has over a thousand credit analysts and
supervisors,203 and each rating requires a credit committee of various
compositions of analysts, all of whom (analysts and committees) would
presumably be exercising independent judgments on many thousands of
bond issues and monitoring of outstanding issues. In the business of credit
ratings, coordinating collusion cannot occur absent an explicitly illegal,
broadly disseminated (thus easily discoverable) edict from the executive
suite or the boardroom.
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See id. at 424 (suggesting that unsolicited ratings “provide a check against ratings shopping”).
See generally ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION:
CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS (2012) (providing economic analyses of anticompetitive behavior).
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SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 8; SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
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Even if there is an illicit conspiracy to undermine the competition
from the top, the execution at the bottom would be very difficult. Such topdown coordination cannot work when there are thousands of decision
points in each firm that must then be coordinated with those of several
other firms. Coordinating performance and statistical outcomes, many of
which are subject to uncertainty and market forces, would be practically
infeasible even with tacit coordination. The complexity of coordination
increases with each player added to the competition.
A misstep in any coordinated action would quickly unravel a
coalition. Assume a coordinated “one for you, one for me” agreement to
maintain the status quo. Each firm may be tempted to cheat in light of the
large financial payoff in any given year from the performance bonus, or
each agent within the firm may have reasons to not abide by the firm
objective, such as employee performance bonuses and career merits. A
collusive, tacit agreement among three players would be highly unstable,
and would likely devolve into active competition once the pattern of “one
for you, one for me” is broken due to cheating, miscalculation, or some
exogenous factor leading to unintended or unexpected outcomes. When
rating agencies are forced to compete on merit, the possibility of collusion
with so many moving parts is unlikely.
B. Standard for Performance Assessments
In the field of executive compensation, a pay-for-performance
compensation scheme requires the promulgation of a standard to measure
performance. This is easier said than done. Among other issues, there are
questions as to the metric to be measured, the method for measurement,
and the timing of measurement and compensation. The complexity of the
problem is high. A similar but more difficult problem confronts the
proposal here: how does an agency determine “the winner” of pay for
performance? This problem of performance measurement is more difficult
than in the context of executive compensation because there are, quite
literally, thousands of data points on performance. I do not offer or
advocate a specific assessment protocol. The purpose of this Article is to
present the conceptual framework for reform. Experts in statistics and data
analysis would be required to recommend and implement a technical
protocol. However, the problem of performance measurement is not
insurmountable. I offer the following thoughts on implementation.
First, the assessment criteria must be based on accuracy and not on
downward deviations of issues from ratings. The focus should not be on
how many issues were overrated since it would impose a bias toward
underrated securities resulting in significant detriment to issuers and a
systemic increase in the cost of debt. The magnitude of the error should
count but not directionality. Timeliness is also an important consideration.
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It does the investor no good for a rating agency to downgrade the debt of
company on the eve of bankruptcy, as was the case in Enron.204 Thus,
directional correctness and timeliness are the two most important factors in
formulating the assessment criteria.
Second, the evaluating criteria must be broadly based, covering
performance along all asset classes including difficult-to-rate structured
finance instruments. This requirement would not open up the possibility of
gaming by the rating agencies through calculated changes in the business
mix, such as not entering the structured finance market on account of the
difficulty of rating issues. The mathematics of profitability do not lead to
rating agencies manipulating their business mix to game the overall
performance review since the ceded revenue is a small portion of the fees
earned. In other words, it would be unlikely that a rating agency would give
up 95% of a highly profitable business line to enhance its chances of
winning the 5% bonus pool, particularly since complex instruments such as
structured finance bonds generate significantly higher profit margins.205
Third, an assessment of performance should hinge substantially on
statistical data on performance. Competent experts would be required to
propose a statistical method to measure the quality of performance. There
are many such experts in the academy and the financial profession. The
SEC could also solicit the three largest rating agencies as well as various
constituents of the capital market, including bond investors, to provide
proposed rules and comments on the issue of assessment. The most
difficult part of assessment is formulating the standard based on the criteria
of correctness and timeliness. There is no doubt that various constituents
may differ in opinions, including the rating agencies themselves, but like
most things requiring expert opinion and judgment I have confidence that a
rational, defensible standard can be set. That standard could be as simple as
providing a universal standard based on the probability of default assigned
to each rating, and an assessment could be made based on deviations from
the “correct” standard as weighted by the number of issues and time.
Reporting of credit ratings and defaults can be automated and much of the
data analysis can then be performed with the use of technology and
algorithms. Indeed, I anticipate that the data analysis part of the process
would be far easier than formulating and achieving a consensus on the
precise algorithm for assessment.
Fourth, although the assessment should be primarily based on
quantitative measures of performance, the SEC could add additional
qualitative factors toward a weighted scorecard of best performance. Such
factors can include compliance with rules and regulations, independent
204
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assessments of governance, management of conflict of interest, and quality
of internal controls, all of which were issues addressed in both the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the Dodd–Frank Act and
implemented in SEC rules. The SEC or some other body can engage in
determination of these qualitative factors. For example only, it might be
reasonable for the final assessment to be based on 80% quantitative
performance assessment and 20% compliance-based judgment. One need
not fret too much over what the proper weight should be. It would be an
exercise in asking why a set in tennis is based on winning six games and
not four or eight.206 Why is any given sport or game scored the way it is?
The point is that the standard should define the meaning of excellent
performance, and the rating agencies must meet the standard. A part of that
standard should be judged on compliance.
Fifth, the critical question for implementation is this: can data
analysis reveal “the winner”? Yes, because there is an enormous volume of
statistical data.207 The following is data on outstanding credit ratings
reported by NRSROs to the SEC in 2011208:
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There may be a historic reason why a tennis set is based on six games, but the general point still
holds true. Indeed, tennis rules for determining the winner vary in significant ways. For sets, the rules
for any tournament can provide that a player must win a set by at least two games, or she must win a
tiebreaker based on the first person to reach a specified number of points. For matches, the rules can
provide that a match is based on three or five sets. Regardless of which rules are in play, players and
spectators generally accept the rules as determining the best player on that day, and more importantly
one presumes that players compete equally vigorously irrespective of the specific criteria for judging
the winner.
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See generally LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1. Indeed, the rating agencies approved by the
SEC are called “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations.” Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(a)(3)(I), 124 Stat. 1375, 1874 (2010)
(emphasis added).
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TABLE 6: DATA ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS AS OF 2011

Since there are so many outstanding, maturing, and defaulting issues at
any given time, there is an enormous volume of data from which we can
cull reasonable inferences on performance. Furthermore, the task of
statistical analysis is made much easier by the fact that the industry custom
is a multiple-rating system. It would be a much harder task, though by no
means impossible, to determine which rating agency performed better if
each rated mutually exclusive sets of securities. However, there is great
overlap among the top three agencies. For instance, from 1976 to 2006,
62,496 new domestic issuances of nonconvertible debt were credit rated,
and of these 98.2% were multiple rated: 67.3% by two rating agencies, and
30.8% by all three agencies.209 Consider another example: in a
representative sample of 2514 corporate bonds outstanding at the end of
March 1997, Moody’s had ratings on 92.5% and S&P 90.7%.210 The three
rating agencies substantially overlap in work performed such that side-byside comparisons of performance outcomes are possible. Since there are so
many outstanding, maturing, and defaulting issues at any given time, there
would be no problem of gathering a dataset of ratings based on issues
expiring and defaulting within defined periods of time from which periodic
quality assessments could be performed.
Sixth, the compensation competition is a repeat game, occurring at
regular intervals. This interval need not be yearly, and in fact a multiyear
interval of, for example, 3–5 years seems reasonable. The competition
could be based on only the bond or debt issues expiring or defaulting
during that period. These issues would be examined against the
performance of the issue, initial rating assigned, and changes in rating.
Each rating agency would be evaluated on the performance of the entire
portfolio of expired and defaulting issues against the objective performance
standards set for each credit rating, which is now required under the Dodd–
Frank Act.211
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211
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Lastly, perhaps the most serious criticism of the proposal is what
may be called the perfectionist’s challenge—the argument that any
statistical analysis, however sophisticated, would not be capable of
determining the “true winner.” There would be too many technical
difficulties, such as problems of data sampling, fluidity of credit ratings
over time, different portfolios of covered bond issues, and numerous other
factors that make identifying the best performer imperfect at best. To this
criticism, a fair response might be, “le mieux est l’ennemi du bien.”212
Epistemological certainty is not needed to implement the policy
objective. The standard for assessment should be reasonably fitted to the
objective so that, like any performance bonus, the risk of arbitrariness is
mitigated. But errors, defined as deviations from the epistemological truth,
do not undermine the policy goal. If there is objective application of a
rational standard, we expect that any “errors” would average out for each
player. Since the compensation game is a classic repeat-play game, the
mathematical expectation from an imperfect standard would be zero. In the
long run, the risk of error is diversified away.
Errors are simply a part of the real world, including the legal process.
One accepts that any standard of evaluation may be imperfect and thus
subject to criticism. Many types of evaluative processes are far less
quantitatively driven than the proposal here and subject to the discretion of
individual judgment: just to name a few, the typical performance
evaluations of employees including those of CEOs, tenure reviews of
academics, strategic considerations in business planning, medical
evaluations, and judgments in figure skating competitions. Virtually the
entire panorama of human endeavors and observations is subject to
imperfect evaluations and subjective probability assessments. Consider the
core aspect of the legal process in civil actions—the preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof.213 Based on this standard, we recognize that the
legal process produces many “errors” from the perspective of some
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“Dit que le mieux est l’ennemi du bien.” (“The best is the enemy of the good.”) M. DE
VOLTAIRE, LA BÉGUEULE, CONTE MORAL A3 (Geneva 1772). The aphorism attributed to this quote is
that we should not let the lack of perfection get in the way of implementing something that is a net
good. A related concept is the “nirvana fallacy,” which embodies the idea that we should not compare a
superior, implausible solution to an inferior, plausible solution. See Harold Demsetz, Information and
Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (“The view that now pervades much public
policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing
‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative
institution approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional
arrangements.”).
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See Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into the Selection of
Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 638, 642 (2006) (noting that
“objective probability of legal case assessment is impossible” and that “[l]egal actions cannot be
described in the narrow, symmetric manner that is required for measurement”).
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ontological truth.214 We seek reasonable outcomes based on objective
application of a rational standard of evaluation.
“Who is the winner?” is the penultimate question. It serves the
ultimate inquiry: “Are the players incentivized?” From this perspective, a
perfect assessment standard is not needed to serve this policy end. If a
rational standard is applied objectively, the rating agencies subject to a
performance evaluation will be incentivized to produce accurate credit
ratings for the purpose of winning the competition. That there is some
uncertainty in the process would produce more incentive to win by a
clearer margin; thus, any potential for “errors” may actually benefit the
end. On this point, economic analysis of incentives in the field of torts has
significant application. Scholars have shown that uncertainty in litigation
outcomes can lead to overcompliance.215 The basic argument is that if
uncertainty is distributed normally around the optimal standard of care, and
if the uncertainty is not too great, the legal rule will have an overdeterrence
effect.216 Similarly, if there is some uncertainty surrounding the
determination of the winner, the rating agencies may be incentivized to
work harder to clear the margin of victory. Thus, the policy objective is
served when the standard of evaluation is sufficiently connected to the
criterion of accuracy, though perfect accuracy is not needed.
C. Regulatory Foundation Laid by Dodd–Frank
The proposal requires that a regulator collect the ceded revenue,
assess performance, and award the bonus. Regulation must create an
agency body to oversee the program, and must mandate rating agencies to
collect and maintain data on performance. In this respect, the regulatory
foundation necessary to implement the proposal has already been laid,
which makes the implementation of the proposal easier and more feasible.
The Dodd–Frank Act mandates the regulatory framework necessary
to collect, maintain, and report data on performance. The rating agencies
must provide ratings based on a common system of ratings, including the
designation of alphanumeric ratings and the criteria applicable to each
rating. The rating agencies already use very similar rating symbols.217
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See Robert J. Rhee, The Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 155 (2004) (“But it does not shake the foundation of our legal
system to say that errors, defined as deviations from the omniscient truth, occur frequently by the very
nature of the adversarial system.”).
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See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986).
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Section 938 of the Dodd–Frank Act, titled “Universal Ratings Symbols,”
requires the SEC to implement rules and procedures that:
(1) [A]ssess the probability that an issuer of a security or money market
instrument will default, fail to make timely payments, or otherwise not
make payments to investors in accordance with the terms of the security
or money market instrument;
(2) clearly define and disclose the meaning of any symbol used by the
[NRSRO] to denote a credit rating; and
(3) apply any symbol described in paragraph (2) in a manner that is
consistent for all types of securities and money market instrument for
which the symbol is used.218

There will be a universal standard against which the performance of
rating agencies can be judged and assessed. The statute also imposes a
regulatory reporting and disclosure structure, which has been partially
implemented through SEC rules.219 If additional rules are required to
produce a set of statistical disclosures, this can be done through the auspice
of the Dodd–Frank Act’s mandate.
With respect to an independent body or board that would evaluate
performance and award the incentive bonus, the Dodd–Frank Act created a
structure that could fill this role. Section 932 creates an Office of Credit
Ratings within the SEC.220 Its charge is “to promote accuracy in credit
ratings issued by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations;
and . . . to ensure that such ratings are not unduly influenced by conflicts of
interest.”221 The statute mandates that the staff should have knowledge and
expertise in debt instruments, and that the Office of Credit Ratings should
conduct annual examinations of NRSROs.222 If additional expertise or input
is needed, the Office of Credit Ratings could be composed of regulators,
academics, and disinterested industry professionals who would be tasked
with analyzing performance and making recommendations as to the award
of bonus, and could incorporate additional methods such as an industry
survey of investors and other knowledgeable constituents.
Commentators are correct to note that neither the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006 nor the Dodd–Frank Act has transformed the
regulation of the credit rating industry or fixed the problem in some
218

Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 938,
124 Stat. 1375, 1885 (2010).
219
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17g-2, 240.17g-3 (2012).
220
§ 932, 124 Stat. at 1872, 1877 (amending Section 15E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)).
221
Id. at 1877.
222
Id. Matters to be examined are whether the rating agencies conduct business in accordance with
the established policies and methodologies, manage conflicts of interest, implement ethics policies,
exercise internal supervisory controls, have appropriate corporate governance, and monitor the activities
of credit analysts. Id.
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fundamental way.223 However, it may be too early to write off these statutes
as failed exercises in correcting a difficult problem. The Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006 at least reduces regulatory barriers to entry.
And, the Dodd–Frank Act in particular has enabled at least some of the
process-based rules necessary to administer a pay-for-performance
compensation scheme. In this respect, the two statutes, while not fixing the
problem directly, have enacted the regulatory precursors to fundamental
reform based on greater positive competition and correctly aligned
incentives to perform.
D. Political Reality of Regulation
The economic and administrative feasibility of the proposal here are
well within the realm of practical possibility. More than the potential for
collusion or difficulties of performance metric, the political reality of
effective regulation is the chief impediment to reform of the credit rating
industry. In any regulation affecting corporate and Wall Street interests,
there is always the reality of political feasibility.224 Although no one denies
that better quality credit ratings are clearly a public good, there would be
significant political opposition to effective regulation. The idea of
regulatory capture has long been recognized.225
Obviously the three rating agencies would oppose any attempt to put
any contingencies on accrued revenue, however small. They would want to
keep their rents. The proposal here means that the leading rating agencies
would have to work harder and incur more costs and investments in human
capital to improve the quality of their products and services—the value of
this cost representing a component of the regulatory rent they earn from the
current industrial organization. The political voices of Moody’s, S&P, and
Fitch would be significant.
Other powerful voices would speak against mandated competition.
Investment banks and corporate issuers, which yield greater political clout
than the three rating agencies, would be opposed as well. Several factors
are at work. First, and obviously, issuers like overrated bond issues because
they lower their costs of borrowing. From an issuer’s perspective, a lenient
rating agency is better for business than an objective one. Second, the oftcited conflict of interest ultimately arises from the implicit threat that
223
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See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd–Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to
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Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327 (2013) (same); see also Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt
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See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3
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issuers and their investment bankers might channel rating business to more
lenient rating agencies (in reality, investment bankers are the ones who
would wield this sword since they manage the issues). This is a real source
of power, and it is rational to believe that investment banks would have a
business interest in maintaining the status quo of this leverage. Third,
higher rated bonds are arguably easier to manage in the issuance process,
again making the jobs of investment bankers easier. It is plausible to think
that the greater the credit risk, the greater will be the market scrutiny of the
issue in the underwriting and sales process. Fourth, systemically higher
credit ratings can increase the overall demand for bonds because they relax
the regulatory restrictions on bond investments. Investment banks and
corporate issuers benefit from this greater demand.
Lastly, as mentioned above, the “dirty little secret” of the problem of
credit ratings is that investors also benefit from overrated bonds.226 While
the bond market may have its proverbial “moms and pops” and other
unregulated investors, institutional investors are the major players. There is
a real agency cost associated with the “dirty little secret.” Institutional
investors and bond portfolio managers may desire a freer hand on
investment choices, risk assumption, and desired yields on investments.
This is not to suggest that bond investors like being fooled into bad
investments. A credit rating is one important factor in determining the
“true” value of a bond, but there are other factors that sophisticated
investors can consider. As a number of commentators have noted, credit
ratings do not always correlate with bond yields, credit, or CDS spreads.227
The capital markets also incorporate information on the credit quality of a
bond. This suggests that there is a tradeoff for some bond investors: a freer
hand in pursuing greater yields on investments at the price of less accurate
credit ratings.
With all this said, the political picture is not so bleak. Even as some
bond investors may have conflicting interests, many institutional investors
actually rely on a credit rating system that provides broad coverage of the
bond market.228 The flip side to the argument that there is an agency cost is
that the fidelity of many agents is true to the principal. There are many
institutional bond investors that desire a more accurate credit rating system.
This is the premise of many proposals that would have a user- or
subscriber-pay model, and their underlying assumption about the interests
of many bond investors is not necessarily wrong. Long-term players in the
bond market, such as insurance companies, rely on credit ratings. “Only a
small subset of institutional investors have the ‘in-house’ capacity to
undertake a serious analysis of the creditworthiness of debt securities,
226
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while many funds compete by economizing on such expenses.”229 The bond
market needs the credit rating system, and it is quite plausible that a
sufficient subset of the bond investor community wants greater accuracy in
credit ratings to offset some of the countervailing political pressures.
Credit rating agencies exist because they provide a quantum of value
in intermediating information in the capital markets and serve a quasiregulatory role. If the benefits of these functions were outweighed by the
costs of a continuously compromised credit rating system, the future of
rating agencies would be bleak. This is a possibility recognized by the
rating agencies themselves,230 but this logic of utility and existence is not
deductive conclusion. We must be aware that there is a powerful political
coalition that has a significant economic interest in maintaining the status
quo, inherent flaws and costs notwithstanding.
CONCLUSION
A lesson can be learned from legendary football coach Vince
Lombardi, who taught his players: “Winning is not everything—but
making the effort to win is.”231 This lesson is important in life, in markets,
and in regulation. Credit rating agencies suffer from a lack of competition
and a will to do better than other agencies, which diminishes the quality of
credit ratings. If competition in fact does not exist, regulation should induce
it. Large numbers of competitors are not needed to achieve robust, positive
competition. Contrary to accepted wisdom, an industry of three firms can
be competitive under the right conditions. The condition for competition is
created when a portion of compensation is redirected from consideration
for services rendered to pay for performance. This Article proposes a
winner-take-all bonus scheme that augments the issuer-pay model. The
same funding scheme can be used to increase further competition by
incubating new and smaller rating agencies that would be allowed to
participate in a bonus pool. The bonus pool need not be large relative to
revenue. Even a modest, at-the-margin change can create the necessary
conditions for robust, positive competition.
A compelling rationale supports a mandated, hybrid public–private
compensation scheme. Credit ratings are more than just the opinions of a
private actor; they are a public good. Rating agencies enjoy a regulatory
license that necessitates their service and gives them market status, and the
credit rating system exists in a capital market that creates significant
network externalities. Rating agencies are private firms that report to
shareholders, but they also serve a public gatekeeping role. The main goal
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of regulation should be to change the incentives by altering the relationship
among rating agencies. By mandating a self-funded bonus pool, each firm
is forced to post a bond on good performance and a winner-take-all
tournament is created. At least with respect to the bonus, rating agencies
will not be oligopolists but will instead be competitors. A change in the
relationship will change behavior.
This proposal is economically and administratively feasible. Unlike
other proposed reforms, it does not require a fundamental transformation of
the industrial organization and regulatory framework. It maintains the
duopoly plus industry organization and the issuer-pay model. This
contrarian perspective is the proposal’s principal benefit. Under my
proposal, it is fair to say that as much as 95% of the status quo would be
preserved. The reform is economically feasible and administrable in a fair,
coherent way. As with all reform of Wall Street, the greatest barrier to
reform is the politics of regulation and the alignment of interests. In this
regard, there would be a sufficient constituency of bond investors who
would be interested in seeing an improvement in the quality of credit
ratings as evinced by the passages of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006 and the provisions relating to rating agencies in the Dodd–Frank
Act. Although these statutes did not fundamentally change the credit rating
industry, they laid the foundation necessary to implement the reform
proposal advanced in this Article.
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